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Fifty years ago, former Stanford Law School Dean Charles
Meyers published The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1966), arguably the most famous piece of legal scholarship
ever written on this vital water source and the complex body
of laws governing its flows—colloquially, the “Law of the
River.” That piece and a companion, The Colorado River:
The Treaty with Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 367 (1967), offered
seminal accounts of the legal histories, doctrinal features,
and unresolved perplexities of the Law of the River’s
international and interstate allocation framework. Five
decades later, between thirty-five and forty million U.S.
residents rely on flows controlled by this framework, and a
historic drought and unprecedented water supply and
demand imbalance face the Colorado River Basin. It is a
transformative time for the Law of the River, and this Article
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Law School (2013); LL.M., Harvard Law School (2009); J.D., University of Oregon
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indebted to Professor Tarlock for the time and knowledge he kindly contributed to
this piece. Several other colleagues also generously offered feedback, including
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revisits Meyers’s scholarship from this vantage point. It
begins by considering climate change and related dynamic
changes in and around the basin over the past fifty years. It
then considers the evolution of the Law of the River’s
allocation framework across this period—particularly, since
the historic drought’s onset in 2000. Finally, focusing on the
concept of “adaptive framing,” the Article synthesizes
common patterns in the allocation framework’s evolution,
and offers prescriptions and prognoses regarding the
continuation of these patterns in the future.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

For Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, northern
Arizona was “home country,” 1 his connection to it deep and
familial, his affinity for it gushing and palpable. “One needs
superlatives to describe this special region of the United States,
this Colorado plateau country,” declared the Secretary,
“because both in the terms of the works of man—and we’re on a
great engineering feat, standing on it here today—and in the
terms of the works of nature, there are superlative things
here.” 2 The date was September 22, 1966, and the “great
engineering feat” on which the Secretary stood beside other
federal, state, and tribal dignitaries was Glen Canyon Dam.
Perhaps most notable among his colleagues on this historic
occasion was “Lady Bird” Johnson, First Lady and wife of
President Lyndon B. Johnson, for it was upon her shoulders
that the dam’s dedication rested. “[T]here is only one
sculptured earth of painted canyons,” described the First Lady
in her dedicatory remarks, “and that is here on the Colorado
Plateau.” 3 Through these words and other truly eloquent
1. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON DAM DEDICATION
CEREMONY 2–3 (1966), http://archive.library.nau.edu/cdm/ref/collection/cpa/id/
36130 [https://perma.cc/H79B-J9VV] [hereinafter GLEN CANYON TRANSCRIPT].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 8.
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expressions, the First Lady’s dedication channeled the views of
the Secretary and other attendees regarding the beauty and
ancient texture of this distinct place. Yet undoubtedly so too
did her appraisal of the dam. “As I look around at this
incredibly beautiful and creative work,” the First Lady stated
in reference to the “plug in the river” seen earlier from her
plane, “it occurs to me that this is a new kind of ‘writing on the
walls’—a kind that says proudly and beautifully ‘Man was
here.’ . . . I am proud to dedicate such a significant and
beautiful manmade resource. I am proud that ‘Man is here.’” 4
Indeed, “Man is here,” to co-opt the First Lady’s sentiment
five decades later. Our collective thirst for water from the river
system impounded by Glen Canyon Dam has given rise in
contemporary times to an unprecedented imbalance between
the satiation of that thirst on one hand, and, to co-opt
Secretary Udall in equal measure, the hydrological bounty of
this “superlative” corner of North America on the other. It is a
challenging phase for all who value the Colorado River and its
tributaries as a lifeline—or, more precisely, as a giver of those
things that make life both possible and worthwhile.
To convey the situation in slightly more concrete terms, no
fewer than thirty-five to forty million people in the United
States—roughly equivalent to between one in eight and one in
nine U.S. residents—currently rely on water from the Colorado
River Basin. 5 For the first time in the basin’s history, the water
demands of this population exceeded available water supplies
on average across the past decade. 6 Absent changes in the
status quo, the Bureau of Reclamation’s extensive Colorado
River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study (Basin Study)
projected this supply-demand imbalance will widen over the
next five decades—perhaps to the median projection of 3.2

Id. at 8–9.
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN STAKEHOLDERS
MOVING FORWARD TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED IN THE COLORADO RIVER
BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY, PHASE I REPORT 1 (2015),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/MovingForward/Phase1Report/f
ullreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5K3-V4QE] [hereinafter PHASE I REPORT]; U.S.
and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
popclock/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2016) [https://perma.cc/T5LQ-YUVD].
6. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY
AND DEMAND STUDY, STUDY REPORT SR-7 fig.2 (2012), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Study%20Report/CRBS_Study_Report_FIN
AL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4MP-HKA8] [hereinafter STUDY REPORT].
4.
5.
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million acre-feet (maf), equivalent to an annual shortfall of
more than one-trillion gallons of water, but perhaps more or
less. 7 Climate change is a key variable in this unfolding
equation. Average surface air temperature in the basin has
risen 2.5 degrees Fahrenheit (1.39 degrees Celsius) since
around the turn of the twentieth century, and a roughly 2.0
degree Fahrenheit (1.11 degree Celsius) increase has been
observed since roughly the time of Glen Canyon Dam’s
dedication (from 1970 to 2005). 8 In a similar fashion, the basin
has been in a historic drought for the past decade-and-a-half,
with natural flows at the dividing point between the Upper
Basin and Lower Basin, “Lee Ferry,” declining between 2000
and 2015 to levels that are lower than any observed over the
past century and some of the lowest over the past 1,200 years
based on paleo records. 9 The Basin Study projected these
climatic and hydrological patterns will persist for the next half
century, occurring contemporaneously with demands for
Colorado River System water unlike anything seen in the
basin’s history. 10
In truly countless ways, these daunting yet opportune
circumstances involve an elaborate body of laws called the
“Law of the River,” 11 with arguably the most famous piece of
7. See PHASE I REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 (describing plausible supplydemand imbalances ranging “from no imbalance to 6.8 million acre-feet (MAF)
with a median of 3.2 MAF in 2060”). One acre-foot is the volume of water required
to cover an acre of land to a depth of one foot—equivalent to 325,851 gallons.
Water Science Glossary of Terms, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://water.usgs.gov/
edu/dictionary.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5WWJ-2U62].
The Basin Study’s median imbalance projection thus equates to 1,042,723,200,000
gallons.
8. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY
AND DEMAND STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT B—WATER SUPPLY ASSESSMENT B-16
fig.B-7
(2012),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/
Technical%20Report%20B%20-%20Water%20Supply%20Assessment/TR-B_
Water_Supply_Assessment_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/N847-JLV2] [hereinafter
TECHNICAL REPORT B].
9. Drought in the Colorado River Basin, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
https://www.doi.gov/water/owdi.cr.drought/en/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/N4VV-KEE8] [hereinafter Open Data].
10. But see Letter from Victor R. Baker, Regents’ Professor of Hydrology and
Water Res., Univ. of Ariz., to Sally Jewell, Sec’y of the Interior 2 (Oct. 12, 2015),
http://www.livingrivers.org/pdfs/LetterToJewell13October2015Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WVX-RHW3] [hereinafter Baker Letter] (questioning water
demand forecasts).
11. This colloquial term generally refers to the collective body of federal and
state laws governing allocation and management of water in the Colorado River
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legal scholarship ever penned on this corpus coming from
former Stanford Law School Dean Charles Meyers. 12 A native
Texan like Lady Bird Johnson, Meyers published his
“magisterial” article, 13 The Colorado River, in November
1966—two months after the First Lady dedicated Glen Canyon
Dam—following suit the next year with a co-authored
companion piece, The Colorado River: The Treaty with
Mexico. 14 Neither the subject matter nor the timing of these
articles were a bit surprising, for Meyers had begun his work in
water law “at the top” of the field a decade prior, 15 serving as
law clerk to Special Master Simon Rifkind from 1956 to 1960
during the epic Colorado River battle of Arizona v. California.16
Eleven years in the making, the Supreme Court handed down
its principal decision in this original jurisdiction action in
1963. 17 It announced (or arguably clarified) an apportionment
for the Lower Colorado River that interfaced with
apportionments previously established by the Colorado River
Compact in 1922, 18 the U.S.-Mexico Treaty in 1944, 19 and the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact in 1948. 20 In this
manner, Arizona v. California implanted the final component
of the Law of the River’s integrated international and

system. See generally Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Colorado River Basin, in 4 WATER
AND WATER RIGHTS 5 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 2011) (surveying Law of the River).
12. Meyers had a storied career in natural resources law. See, e.g., G. EMLEN
HALL, HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE FOR THE PECOS RIVER
164–96 (2002); A. Dan Tarlock, Tribute, 29 NAT. RES. J. 327, 327–29 (1989).
13. HALL, supra note 12, at 168.
14. Charles J. Meyers & Richard L. Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty
with Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 367 (1967); Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River,
19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
15. Tarlock, supra note 12, at 328–29.
16. 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Tarlock, supra note 12, at 328–29; HALL, supra note
12, at 168. The U.S. Supreme Court appoints Special Masters to preside over
interstate water suits in the manner of trial judges, and Meyers actually passed
away while serving in this capacity for a dispute between New Mexico and Texas
over the Pecos River Compact. HALL, supra note 12, at 164–96. For insights into
Special Master Rifkind and his work in Arizona v. California, see Meyers, supra
note 14, at 43, 51 n.207.
17. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
18. Colorado River Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, COLO. REV. STAT. §
37-61-101 to -104 (2016) [hereinafter Compact].
19. Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the
Rio Grande, Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico, U.S.-Mex.,
Feb. 3, 1944, T.S. 994 [hereinafter Treaty].
20. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949)
[hereinafter Upper Basin Compact].
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interstate allocation framework for the Colorado River System.
Meyers’s scholarship emerged at this historic confluence,
channeling the wealth of knowledge he had gained while
working alongside Special Master Rifkind to offer seminal
accounts of the legal histories, doctrinal nuances, and thenlooming legal and policy issues associated with the nested
apportionments. 21
Taking Meyers’s publication of The Colorado River in 1966
as its starting point, this Article considers, from both positive
and normative angles, the Law of the River’s retrospective
evolution over the past fifty years through historical periods
dubbed the “Big Buildup” and “Era of Limits,” and its
prospective evolution forging ahead into the latter period.22
There are numerous facets to this evolution, including salient
developments related to water rights held by American Indian
tribes within the Colorado River Basin, 23 as well as recovery
and conservation programs being implemented for endemic fish
species listed under the Endangered Species Act. 24 For sake of
narrowing, however, my discrete focus is on the core matters
around which Meyers’s scholarship itself revolved: the four
apportionments identified above that constitute the Law of the
River’s international and interstate allocation framework.
The Article flows in three Parts to this end. Part II initially
grounds the inquiry in place. It puts the evolution of the Law of
the River’s allocation framework into spatial and temporal

21. HALL, supra note 12, at 168 (describing how The Colorado River “summed
up what Meyers had seen and learned in the California-Arizona battle”). More
precisely, as elaborated in Part III, The Colorado River addressed the historical,
doctrinal, and policy matters noted for the Colorado River Compact, Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact, and Arizona v. California decree, while The
Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico covered similar ground in relation to that
instrument.
22. CHARLES WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU: CONFLICT AND ENDURANCE
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST xii (1999) (“Big Buildup”); Felix L. Sparks, Article
Update, Synopsis of Major Documents and Events Relating to the Colorado River,
3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 339, 341–42 (2000) (“Era of Limits”).
23. See generally Amy Cordalis & Daniel Cordalis, Indian Water Rights: How
Arizona v. California Left an Unwanted Cloud over the Colorado River Basin, 5
ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 333 (2015) (discussing Arizona v. California’s historical
and contemporary implications for tribal water rights in Colorado River Basin).
24. For an excellent source addressing the history and features of these
programs, the value choices underlying them, and ultimately the future of our
socio-ecological systems in and around the Colorado River Basin, see ROBERT W.
ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF
IMMENSITY (2007).
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context by introducing the Colorado River Basin as an actual
place simultaneously shaped by and shaping this body of laws.
Proceeding on this basis, the discussion then illuminates
dynamic changes in and around this place since Meyers’s
scholarship, including the ongoing water supply and demand
imbalance. Part III, in turn, tracks the allocation framework’s
evolution to date, particularly over the past two decades during
the historic drought. It introduces the framework’s constituent
apportionments, singularly and relationally, and chronicles key
milestones associated with their evolution since the drought’s
onset and slightly before. Finally, Part IV synthesizes the
preceding content and sets eyes on the future. Through the
concept of “adaptive framing,” it identifies and discusses
common adaptive patterns apparent when stepping back and
analyzing the apportionments’ evolutionary paths detailed in
Part III from a comparative perspective. The specific nature of
these patterns, and the various developments encompassed
within them, are addressed fully in Parts IV and III,
respectively. Painting in broad strokes, the patterns generally
concern three topics: (1) water-use rationing and risk
allocation, (2) management of interpretive conflicts
surrounding framing provisions of the apportionments, and (3)
avoidance or mitigation of constraints on water use imposed by
these instruments. Part IV brings these patterns to light and
assesses their persistence, including offering prognoses and
prescriptions regarding how the allocation framework
foreseeably will, and arguably should, evolve in coming years.
Underpinning this entire inquiry is the viewpoint that the Law
of the River is in the midst of a truly transformative stage, and
that citizens and policymakers alike bear an intergenerational
obligation to steward this complex body of laws in its further
evolution through this era. As goes the Law of the River, so go
the fates of all it touches. For a glimpse of this rich, indelible
patrimony, we turn to the Colorado River Basin itself.
II. CHANGE & CONTINUITY IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN
“[H]ere you have in this one region oil, gas, uranium, great
reserves of coal, and, of course, the other indispensable
resource . . . water. . . . Water is the key resource, and you can
develop your other resources if you husband your water and
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use it wisely.” 25 Secretary Udall offered this perspective on the
Colorado River Basin’s natural resources the year after his
appointment by President John F. Kennedy. 26 The setting was
Navajo Dam’s dedication on September 15, 1962—an event
plainly significant for the project itself, but for present
purposes even more so for the infrastructural wave of which
the project was the vanguard. It was the Colorado River
Storage Project Act that had put this wave into motion in
1956. 27 Navajo Dam was the “firstborn” of four large-scale dam
and reservoir projects authorized by the Act. It would be
followed by the Colorado River Basin Project Act 28 in 1968,
with Meyers’s scholarship emerging in the interim. Taken
together, the plumbing system spawned by these laws would
fundamentally change the make-up of the basin and vast
outlying areas.
Charles Wilkinson coined the term the “Big Buildup” to
capture the multifarious aspects of this era at the millennium’s
turn. 29 They have involved all of the resources mentioned by
Secretary Udall, and the Colorado River has been central
among them. For the most part, the Big Buildup now appears
to have run its course, and a transition seems to have been
made to an era of intertwined hydrological and institutional
limits (Era of Limits). 30 Illustrative of this view are the facts
that no major water projects have been authorized in the basin
since the late 1960s and that existing and projected demands
for Colorado River System water in many cases pose serious
viability and sustainability questions given water supply
limits. From another perspective, however, the Big Buildup
appears to have been in full swing for the past fifty years and
apparently is poised to continue, in some peoples’ minds, for
several decades. This perception is particularly evident with
respect to population growth and water demand projections.
After conveying a sense of the basin as a place, this Part sheds
25. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, NAVAJO DAM DEDICATION 15 (1962),
http://archive.library.nau.edu/cdm/ref/collection/cpa/id/36168
[https://perma.cc/
EJH7-8L3J] [hereinafter NAVAJO TRANSCRIPT].
26. Past
Secretaries,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
THE
INTERIOR,
http://www.doi.gov/whoweare/past_secretaries.cfm (last visited Aug. 26, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/2GU3-27TF].
27. Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 620–620o (2012).
28. Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1556 (2012).
29. WILKINSON, supra note 22, at xii.
30. Sparks, supra note 22, at 341–42.
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light on these patterns and the dizzying pace of change in and
around the basin across the conjoined periods.
Figure 1. Colorado River Basin and Export Areas 31

31.

PHASE I REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-3 fig.1-1.
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A Sense of Place

Jagged, alpine mountains—forested green, snowcapped
white, yet in the main rugged and earthen true to their essence
as the Rocky Mountains—converge in the Colorado River Basin
with a visceral, sunbaked landscape of low desert and its
countless red, orange, and chocolate hues. Proverbial seas of
sagebrush span the high desert between these topographical
extremes, receding as far as the eye can see away from ranges
like Wyoming’s Winds, Colorado’s San Juans, and Utah’s
Uintas and Wasatch, later to blend seamlessly into
otherworldly red rock country. It is generally an arid and semiarid place. The Upper Basin mountains bear snow and rain at
variable and sometimes abundant levels, but these gifts fall in
counterpoise to the basin’s expansive, dry interior and often
scorching Lower Basin reaches. 32 The basin is vast—occupying
244,000 square miles in the southwestern United States and
northwestern Mexico 33—and immeasurably rich in both
material and immaterial resources.
Multi-layered legal and political lines adhere to the
Colorado River Basin in modern times. It encompasses portions
of seven U.S. states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming)—collectively, the “Basin
States”—and two Mexican states (Baja California and
Sonora). 34 Twenty-eight American Indian reservations likewise
fall within the basin, including the two largest in the United
States: the Navajo Nation in the Four Corners region and the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation in eastern Utah. 35 Also
pervasive are diverse lands owned and managed by the federal
government, including hallmarks like Rocky Mountain
National Park at the Colorado River’s headwaters, and Grand
Canyon National Park near the dividing point of the Upper

32. For a map depicting the basin’s climate, see TECHNICAL REPORT B, supra
note 8, at B-14 fig.B-5.
33. See MacDonnell, supra note 11, at 6.
34. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-3 fig.1-1.
35. For a reservations map, see U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO
RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT C – WATER
DEMAND ASSESSMENT C-40 fig.C-17 (2012), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Technical%20Report%20C%20%20Water%20Dema
nd%20Assessment/TR-C-Water_Demand_Assessmemt_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84GZ-UPEU] [hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORT C].
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Basin and Lower Basin at Lee Ferry. 36
As for the river system itself, a journey of more than 1,400
miles marks the Colorado River’s meandering course from its
headwaters in the Colorado Rockies to its delta at the Gulf of
California, 37 though it has been rare for significant flows to
reach the river’s mouth for over a half century. 38 The primary
tributary of the Colorado River is the Green River. 39 Its
headwaters lie in southwestern Wyoming’s Wind River Range,
and it is along this historic water body that visionary John
Wesley Powell commenced the first scientific expedition of the
Colorado River System in 1869. 40 The San Juan River, too,
contributes generously to the Colorado River’s mainstream,
flowing from its alpine headwaters in southwestern Colorado
as the system’s third largest tributary. 41 Of greatest
hydrological significance within the Lower Basin is the Gila
River. It stems from eastern New Mexico’s Black Range—
merging with the Salt and Verde Rivers in central Arizona—
and, if its flows are not fully consumed after traversing the
entire Grand Canyon State, it joins the Colorado River at
Yuma.
Varied and voluminous uses are made of Colorado River
System water. This subject is treated fully below, but it is
worth reiterating that thirty-five to forty million people in the
United States utilize these flows—again, equivalent to between
one in eight and one in nine U.S. residents. 42 Major
36. For a federal lands map, see NAT’L ATLAS, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
FEDERAL LANDS AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS (2005), http://nationalmap.gov/
small_scale/printable/images/pdf/fedlands/fedlands3.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G9GRL8P]. Lee Ferry’s significance with regard to basinwide water supplies and the
Colorado River Compact’s apportionment is respectively discussed infra sections
II.B.3 and III.B.
37. MacDonnell, supra note 11, at 6.
38. COLORADO RIVER GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, GETCHES-WILKINSON CENTER
FOR NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, RETHINKING THE
FUTURE OF THE COLORADO RIVER, DRAFT INTERIM REPORT OF THE COLORADO
RIVER GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE 3 fig.1 (2010), http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=books_reports_studies
[https://perma.cc/
54NW-KBAD] [hereinafter CRGI REPORT].
39. See TECHNICAL REPORT B, supra note 8, at B-22 (noting Green River
contributes 33 percent of Colorado River’s natural flow).
40. See generally JOHN WESLEY POWELL, THE EXPLORATION OF THE
COLORADO RIVER AND ITS CANYONS (1875).
41. See TECHNICAL REPORT B, supra note 8, at B-22 (noting San Juan River
contributes 13 percent of Colorado River’s natural flow).
42. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 5, at 1; U.S. and World Population Clock,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2016)
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metropolitan areas outside the basin import this lifeblood—
including Los Angeles, San Diego, Denver, Salt Lake City, and
Albuquerque—while in-basin counterparts like Phoenix and
Las Vegas are comparably reliant. 43 Yet it is agriculture that
receives the lion’s share. Approximately 70 percent of these
flows irrigate nearly four and a half million acres in and
around the basin. 44 Of course, these municipal and agricultural
uses should not obscure wide-ranging non-consumptive uses of
system water, including environmental flows for habitat and
species, soul-enriching, lucrative recreation, and large-scale
hydropower generation. 45
B.

A Sense of Pace

With so much to offer so many, it is perhaps unsurprising
during the Anthropocene 46 for the Colorado River Basin and its
environs to have been the site of mind-bending human
alteration, habitation, and utilization since Meyers’s
scholarship commensurate with the Big Buildup. Plumbing the
river system, and peopling the landscape with its flows, have
been integral parts of this socio-ecological pattern. So too has a
dire result involving the interplay of these variables: “point
tipping” with regard to water supplies and demands.
1. Plumbing
“Unregulated, the Colorado River wouldn’t be worth a good
God damn to anybody.” 47 Who else would have expressed
himself in such artful terms but the Bureau of Reclamation’s
famous (in some quarters, infamous), irascible, and arguably
most colorful of all commissioners, Floyd Dominy, a force of
nature referred to throughout the agency simply as the
[https://perma.cc/T5LQ-YUVD].
43. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-2.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. This term is a proposed label for the current epoch in geological time. It
generally accounts for the pervasive impacts of human activities on the biosphere.
See, e.g., Joseph Stromberg, What is the Anthropocene and Are We in It?,
SMITHSONIAN MAG., http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-is-theanthropocene-and-are-we-in-it-164801414/?no-ist (last visited Oct. 24, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/MLE2-N49W].
47. JOHN MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID 240 (1971).
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“Kmish,” who held his office from 1959 to 1969 during one of
the Bureau’s liveliest periods. 48 And who else would have
elicited such vitriol but the “archdruid” David Brower—
Executive Director of the Sierra Club during a stint marked
largely by epic battles between the conservation movement and
the Bureau over proposed construction of Echo Park Dam in
Dinosaur National Monument, and Bridge Canyon and Marble
Canyon dams in the Grand Canyon. 49 These dam fights grew
out of Congress’s passage of the Colorado River Storage Project
Act in 1956 and the Colorado River Basin Project Act in 1968.
The projects brought into being by these laws completed the
basin’s plumbing system, and in so doing facilitated the varied
aspects of the Big Buildup.
Only a snapshot of the plumbing system is possible here,
but looking briefly at the Colorado River Storage Project Act,
the projects it authorized—most notably, Lake Powell and Glen
Canyon Dam—constitute “one of the most complex and
extensive river resource developments in the world.” 50
Located adjacent to the northern Arizona community of
Page, Glen Canyon Dam is the third-highest concrete arch dam
in the United States (only Hoover Dam and Dworshak Dam are
higher), and backs up the nation’s second-largest reservoir in
terms of storage capacity (only Lake Mead has more) just
upstream of Lee Ferry along the Colorado River. 51 It might be
impossible to find a more polarizing water project. Secretary
Udall proclaimed Lake Powell “the most scenic and most
beautiful manmade lake in the world” at Glen Canyon Dam’s
dedication in 1966, 52 echoing Floyd Dominy’s appraisals of the
48. Id. at 191; Commissioners of Reclamation, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
http://www.usbr.gov/history/commiss.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/8ZTX-PHDJ].
49. David Brower’s “archdruid” title comes from MCPHEE, supra note 47. For
excellent accounts of these dam fights, see MARK W. T. HARVEY, A SYMBOL OF
WILDERNESS: ECHO PARK AND THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT (1994),
and RUSSELL MARTIN, A STORY THAT STANDS LIKE A DAM: GLEN CANYON AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF THE WEST (1989).
50. UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMMISSION, SIXTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT
31 (2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter UCRC 2015 REPORT].
51. See, e.g., List of Tallest Dams in the World, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tallest_dams_in_the_world (last visited Aug.
26, 2016) [https://perma.cc/BBE2-YT76]; Upper Colorado Region, Colorado River
Storage
Project,
Lake
Powell,
U.S.
BUREAU
OF
RECLAMATION,
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/gc/lakepowell.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/3NJZ-JXDL].
52. GLEN CANYON TRANSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 3.
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reservoir as the “Jewel of the Colorado” and “Taj Mahal of
America.” 53 In contrast, David Brower regarded the dam’s
existence—specifically, the fact that he did not fight its
authorization in the Colorado River Storage Project Act—as
“the greatest failure of his life.” 54 In his assessment, “Lake
Powell is a drag strip for power boats. It’s for people who won’t
do things except the easy way. The magic of Glen Canyon is
dead. It has been vulgarized. Putting water in the Cathedral in
the Desert was like urinating in the crypt of St. Peter’s.” 55
Regardless of precisely where one falls between these two
poles, it is plain that Glen Canyon Dam’s completion in 1963,
Lake Powell’s filling in 1980, and the project’s operation across
and since this time period has worked monumental changes in
and around the basin.
Although Glen Canyon Dam and Lake Powell mark the
Colorado River Storage Project’s centerpiece, the basin’s
history over the past half century also has involved
construction and operation of three other major dam and
reservoir projects noted earlier within the Upper Basin.
Situated on the San Juan River in northern New Mexico,
Navajo Dam and Reservoir again was the first project in this
line, with the dam’s completion and reservoir’s filling occurring
in 1963. 56 Secretary Udall offered a prescient forecast at the
dam’s dedication the year prior: “Next year and the next and
the next, we’re going to have ceremonies like this in Arizona
and Utah and Colorado. This is just the beginning.” 57 President
Kennedy, in turn, bore out the Secretary’s message as one of
his last official acts before the assassination in Dallas, visiting
Salt Lake City on September 27, 1963, to press a key to start
the first generator at Flaming Gorge Dam on the Green River
just south of the Utah-Wyoming border. 58 Lady Bird Johnson
53. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, LAKE POWELL: JEWEL OF THE COLORADO
(1965),
https://www.usbr.gov/projects/pdf.php?id=227
[https://perma.cc/Z4F24PWT]; JEDEDIAH ROGERS, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON UNIT
at
37
(2006),
http://www.usbr.gov/projects/ImageServer?imgName=Doc_
1232657383034.pdf [https://perma.cc/82N4-V4VD].
54. MCPHEE, supra note 47, at 163.
55. Id. at 240.
56. TONI LINENBERGER, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE NAVAJO UNIT at
12, 15 (1998), https://www.usbr.gov/projects/pdf.php?id=86 [https://perma.cc/
VY2Q-5WB3].
57. NAVAJO TRANSCRIPT, supra note 25, at 14.
58. ROY WEBB, LOST CANYONS OF THE GREEN RIVER: THE STORY BEFORE
FLAMING GORGE DAM 121 (2012).
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dedicated the dam the following year. 59 Finally, a trio of dams
and reservoirs along the Gunnison River in central Colorado,
the Aspinall Unit, was the fourth and final project to be built,
emerging between 1966 and 1976. 60 Beyond these large-scale
dams and reservoirs, the Colorado River Storage Project Act,
coupled with legislation in 1962 and 1964, authorized
seventeen “participating projects,” 61 including two major
transbasin diversions: the Central Utah Project serving Salt
Lake City and the Wasatch Front, and the San-Juan Chama
Project serving Albuquerque and Santa Fe.
Just as the Colorado River Storage Project Act featured
Glen Canyon Dam and Lake Powell as its chief components, so
too did the Colorado River Basin Project Act in 1968 pave the
way for a proverbial Giant Octopus: the Central Arizona
Project (CAP), “[t]he most expensive Bureau of Reclamation
project ever constructed.” 62 The CAP transports up to 1.5 maf
annually from the Colorado River mainstream at Lake Havasu
through a 336-mile aqueduct system serving the cities of
Phoenix and Tucson as well as a host of agricultural water
users and American Indian tribes. 63 The CAP’s story is full of
historical morsels, including its roots in George H. Maxwell’s
pitch for an Arizona Highline Canal in 1922 (a “mad man’s
dream”); its role three decades later in precipitating Arizona v.
California 64 in the Supreme Court; and, contemporaneous with
Meyers’s scholarship, its post-Arizona v. California instigation
of the Grand Canyon dam fights during the 1960s. 65 The
Colorado River Basin Project Act brought the CAP to fruition.
Three years after the Act’s passage, the Central Arizona Water

59. TONI LINENBERGER, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE FLAMING GORGE
UNIT at 19 (1998), http://www.usbr.gov/projects/ImageServer?imgName=Doc_
1272984854191.pdf [https://perma.cc/34EJ-KRYX].
60. See ZACHARY REDMOND, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, WAYNE
ASPINALL UNIT at 30, 39, 50 (2000), http://www.usbr.gov/projects/
ImageServer?imgName=Doc_1272984948607.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7G4-FL7Y].
61. UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at 51 tbl.6.
62. JENNIFER ZUNIGA, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE CENTRAL ARIZONA
PROJECT 2 (2000), http://www.usbr.gov/projects/ImageServer?imgName=Doc_
1303158888395.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CJ9-V7Q8]. See generally RICH JOHNSON,
THE CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT, 1918–1968 (1977) (chronicling CAP history).
63. Lower Colorado Region, Phoenix Area Office – Facilities, Central Arizona
Project, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/phoenix/projects/
capproj.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/NP9K-8PLR].
64. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
65. ZUNIGA, supra note 62, at 17–30; MARTIN, supra note 49, at 256–57.
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Conservation District (CAWCD) originated to contract with the
federal government for the project’s construction—a multidecade process commenced in 1973. 66 CAP water subsequently
reached Phoenix and Tucson for the first time in 1985 and
1993, respectively, with the latter deliveries marking the
project’s “substantial completion.” 67
Far more could be said about the authorization,
construction, and operation of the Colorado River Storage
Project and CAP over the past half century, and Part III covers
some of this additional ground. For now, it is fitting to shift
from this infrastructure to a closely intertwined discussion of
population growth by highlighting the fact that “no substantial
reclamation projects have been authorized” within the Colorado
River Basin since the CAP in 1968. 68
2. Peopling
Water stored in, and delivered from, the foregoing water
projects and their predecessors has grown human populations
inside and adjacent to the Colorado River Basin just as it has
grown crops. 69 Demographic trends in the Basin States over
the past several decades are eye popping. This sentiment
applies to the extent and rate of population growth as well as to
the degree of urbanization. A brief quantitative overview of
these trends appears below.
Table 1 offers an initial regional perspective on the Basin
States’ “peopling” since The Colorado River. 70 In a nutshell, the
collective trend involves more than a doubling of the basin

66. ZUNIGA, supra note 62, at 32–34.
67. Id. at 34–35.
68. Id. at 52.
69. See, e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 22, at xii (describing the Big Buildup as
a concerted campaign for “rapid, wholesale development of the energy and water
of the Colorado Plateau,” and noting how the campaign transformed modern
Southwest “from a back-water region of 8 million people at the end of World War
II into a powerhouse of 32 million” at millennium’s turn).
70. All regional figures are calculated from data at Intercensal Estimates of
the Total Resident Population of States: 1960 to 1970, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/
1980s/tables/st6070ts.txt (last visited Aug. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/A325-2AQS];
Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions,
States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2015, POPULATION DIVISION, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, www.census.gov/popest/data/national/totals/2015/index.html
(last visited Aug. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/JLH8-Z6X8].
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states’ population at a triple-digit rate greater than twice the
national average. California’s addition of roughly twentymillion residents is perhaps most remarkable in terms of net
growth, but Nevada’s more than quintupling population cannot
go unmentioned.
Table 1. Basin State Population Growth
1966
Population
Arizona

2015
Population

Net Growth

Growth
Rate

1,614,000

6,828,065

5,214,065

323%

California

18,858,000

39,144,818

20,286,818

108%

Colorado

2,007,000

5,456,574

3,449,574

172%

446,000

2,890,845

2,444,845

548%

New Mexico

1,007,000

2,085,109

1,078,109

107%

Utah

1,009,000

2,995,919

1,986,919

197%

Nevada

Wyoming
Basin State Total
U.S. Total

323,000

586,107

263,107

81%

25,264,000

59,987,437

34,723,437

137%

195,501,000

321,418,820

125,917,820

64%

Although insightful in many ways, one shortcoming of
these regional figures is their lack of precision. Specifically, the
figures account for each Basin State’s entire population as
opposed to solely those segments either (1) located within the
Colorado River Basin, or (2) located outside the basin but to
which water from the Colorado River System is exported.
Tables 2 and 3 offer a lens on the former group (i.e., inbasin population growth). The most current Bureau of
Reclamation data addressing these trends illuminate in-basin
population growth within the Upper Basin from 1976 to 2014, 71
and within the Lower Basin from 1976 to 2005. 72 Three
71. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, PROVISIONAL UPPER COLORADO RIVER
BASIN CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES REPORT 2011–2015 at 18 tbl.UC-8 (2016),
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/library/envdocs/reports/crs/pdfs/cul2011-15prov.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V4TB-9B5X] [hereinafter 2015 CUL REPORT]; U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES
REPORT 1976–1980 at 31 tbl.UC-8 (1980), http://www.usbr.gov/uc/library/envdocs/
reports/crs/pdfs/1976.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TZ3-G6WK] [hereinafter 1980 CUL
REPORT].
72. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN CONSUMPTIVE
USES AND LOSSES REPORT 2001–2005
at
42
tbl.LC-10
(2012),
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/library/envdocs/reports/crs/pdfs/cul2001-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72VK-3CFD] [hereinafter 2005 CUL REPORT]; 1980 CUL
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highlights are worth mentioning: (1) a more than doubling of
the Upper Basin population, (2) a more than tripling of the
Lower Basin population, and (3) a greater than fourfold
increase in both Nevada’s and Utah’s populations within the
Lower Basin.
Table 2. Upper Basin In-Basin Population Growth
1976 Population

2014 Population

Net Growth

Growth Rate

Arizona

31,800

46,600

14,800

47%

Colorado

243,300

594,500

351,200

144%

New Mexico

83,100

155,200

72,100

87%

Utah

77,500

121,800

44,300

57%

Wyoming

43,700

73,700

30,000

69%

479,400

992,000

512,600

107%

Total

Table 3. Lower Basin In-Basin Population Growth

Arizona
California
Nevada
New Mexico

1976 Population

2005 Population

Net Growth

Growth Rate

2,221,000

6,257,400

4,036,400

182%

21,300

29,800

8,500

40%

364,900

2,055,800

1,690,900

463%

51,200

76,100

24,900

49%

Utah

20,100

102,400

82,300

409%

Total

2,678,500

8,521,500

5,843,000

218%

A major reason for the in-basin population growth
disparity within the Upper Basin versus Lower Basin is that,
although the figures above account for Lower Basin
metropolises like Las Vegas and Phoenix, the figures do not
address their Upper Basin counterparts like Denver, Salt Lake
City, and Albuquerque, as the latter fall outside the basin.
Table 4 reveals the intense growth within these metropolitan
areas across the past five decades. As just two vivid examples,
consider Las Vegas’s almost sevenfold population increase, and
the nearly seven-million additional residents now inhabiting
the southern California coastal plain.

REPORT, supra note 71, at 41 tbl.LC-10.
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Table 4. Metropolitan Area Population Growth

Albuquerque, NM 73
Denver, CO 74

1970
Population

2015
Population

Net
Growth

Growth
Rate

359,024

907,301

548,277

153%

1,118,563

2,814,330

1,695,767

152%

1,841,513

674%

273,288

2,114,801

Los Angeles, CA 76

8,463,215

13,340,068

4,876,853

58%

Phoenix, AZ 77

1,039,807

4,574,531

3,534,724

340%

480,152

1,170,266

690,114

144%

1,357,854

3,299,521

1,941,667

143%

351,667

1,010,025

658,358

187%

Las Vegas, NV 75

Salt Lake City, UT 78
San Diego, CA 79
Tucson, AZ 80

Implicit in all of the growth figures above is an
urbanization trend apparent to varied degrees across the Basin
States over the past several decades. Table 5 evidences this
trend by identifying the percentages of the states’ populations
residing in urban areas as of 1970 and 2010. 81 Although the
73. Population Data for Albuquerque, NM, REAL ESTATE CTR., TEX. A&M
UNIV., https://www.recenter.tamu.edu/data/population/#!/msa/Albuquerque%2C_
NM (last visited Aug. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/E6HT-2SPA].
74. Population Data for Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO, REAL ESTATE CTR.,
TEX. A&M UNIV., https://www.recenter.tamu.edu/data/population/#!/msa/DenverAurora-Lakewood%2C_CO (last visited Aug. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/L5DMRLFN].
75. Population Data for Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV, REAL ESTATE
CTR., TEX. A&M UNIV., https://www.recenter.tamu.edu/data/population/#!/msa/
Las_Vegas-Henderson-Paradise%2C_NV
(last
visited
Aug.
9,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/4SAN-9XBM].
76. Population Data for Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA, REAL ESTATE
CTR., TEX. A&M UNIV., https://www.recenter.tamu.edu/data/population/#!/msa/
Los_Angeles-Long_Beach-Anaheim%2C_CA (last visited Aug. 9, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/G7J6-CTQE].
77. Population Data for Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ, REAL ESTATE CTR.,
TEX. A&M UNIV., https://www.recenter.tamu.edu/data/population/#!/msa/PhoenixMesa-Scottsdale%2C_AZ (last visited Aug. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9KKWHRYC].
78. Population Data for Salt Lake City, UT, REAL ESTATE CTR., TEX. A&M
UNIV.,
https://www.recenter.tamu.edu/data/population/#!/msa/Salt_Lake_City%
2C_UT (last visited Aug. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/KV5K-W5NU].
79. Population Data for San Diego-Carlsbad, CA, REAL ESTATE CTR., TEX.
A&M UNIV., https://www.recenter.tamu.edu/data/population/#!/msa/San_DiegoCarlsbad%2C_CA (last visited Aug. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RPP5-VY42].
80. Population Data for Tucson, AZ, REAL ESTATE CTR., TEX. A&M UNIV.,
https://www.recenter.tamu.edu/data/population/#!/msa/Tucson%2C_AZ
(last
visited Aug. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/S5VG-3NQV].
81. All urbanization figures are calculated from data at Urban and Rural
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starkest increases have taken place in Nevada and Utah, the
critical insight is that the pattern of urbanization has been
uniform across the states.
Table 5. Basin State Urbanization
1970 Urban
Percentage
of Population

2010 Urban
Percentage
of Population

Percentage
Increase

Arizona

80%

90%

10%

California

91%

95%

4%

Colorado

79%

86%

7%

Nevada

81%

94%

13%

New Mexico

70%

77%

7%

Utah

80%

91%

11%

Wyoming

61%

65%

4%

This “peopling” survey is necessarily concise, but it should
be flagged in closing that the dynamic, urbanizing growth in
and around the basin since The Colorado River is not projected
to cease in coming years, at least according to the Bureau of
Reclamation’s Basin Study. It forecast 49.3 to 76.5 million
people will reside in the basin or export areas by 2060,82
compared to an estimated 40 million residents as of 2015. 83 To
what extent does this projection align with water supply and
demand conditions at present and looking forward? An answer
appears below that may engender skepticism.
3. Point Tipping
An imbalance between water supplies and demands in the
Colorado River Basin has been on the radar for decades.
Published in December 2012, the Basin Study offered a
detailed contemporary perspective on this subject, but it has
been a major concern since at least as far back as the Pacific
Southwest Water Plan’s release in 1964 just prior to Meyers’s
Population: 1900 to 1990, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
population/censusdata/urpop0090.txt
(last
visited
Aug.
9,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/2X3Q-UEBQ]; 2010 Census Urban Lists Record Layouts, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/urban-rural-2010.html
(last visited Aug. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ T2VP-RPZ9].
82. TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 35, at C-21.
83. Id. at C-20.
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scholarship. 84 The Basin Study provided a wealth of
information in this vein from both retrospective and
prospective angles. To date, it is “the most comprehensive
basin-wide analysis ever undertaken within the Department of
the Interior,” 85 and also remarkably “the first Basin-wide study
conducted by the Basin States and Reclamation that considers
the potential influence of climate change on future water
supply.” 86 Figure 2 largely captures the study’s upshot for
present purposes. 87 Following a steadily increasing trend over
the past half-century, water demands have exceeded water
supplies on average since roughly the historic drought’s onset
in 2000, and this imbalance is projected to widen in coming
decades—albeit by an undetermined margin. The material
below highlights key details of this point-tipping pattern and
projection.

84. See generally U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN
WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY, STUDY REPORT app. 3 SUMMARY OF PAST
COLORADO RIVER BASIN PLANNING STUDIES (2012), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Study%20Report/StudyReport_Appendix3_F
INAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JSE-SMKZ] [hereinafter STUDIES SUMMARY]
(discussing Colorado River Basin water supply and demand studies preceding
Basin Study); U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, PACIFIC SOUTHWEST WATER PLAN
(1964), https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/PSWPRptJan64.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83WR-C47S] [hereinafter WATER PLAN].
85. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, MOVING FORWARD TO ADDRESS THE
CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND
DEMAND STUDY 2 (2014), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/
MovingForward/FactSheet_MovingForward.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD42-X22P].
86. GOVERNOR’S REPRESENTATIVES ON COLO. RIVER OPERATIONS, STATES OF
ARIZ., CAL., COLO., NEV., N.M., UTAH, AND WYO., THE SEVEN BASIN STATES’
COMMITMENTS TO FUTURE ACTIONS FOLLOWING RELEASE OF THE BASIN STUDY 1
(2012), http://crc.nv.gov/files.php/news/6bf8f2168bbecfe468dbfa797ccf0b33/CRCNews-2012-12-12 [https://perma.cc/X8WP-C5UD] [hereinafter BASIN STATES’
COMMITMENTS].
87. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-5 fig.1-2. This figure’s treatment of
Lower Basin tributaries poses a host of methodological issues. See generally U.S.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND
STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT C app. C11 MODELING OF LOWER BASIN TRIBUTARIES
IN THE COLORADO RIVER SIMULATION SYSTEM (2012),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Technical%20Report%20C%20-%20Water%
20Demand%20Assessment/TR-C_Appendix11_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RPQTN52] [hereinafter TRIBUTARIES APPENDIX] (describing issues).
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Figure 2. Historical Supply and Use and Projected Future
Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand1

Demands for Colorado River System water have increased
markedly since The Colorado River. Figure 2 depicts this
pattern as a decadal average. 88 Excluding Lower Basin
tributaries, 89 annual basinwide consumptive uses and losses
(including treaty deliveries to Mexico) grew from
“approximately 13 maf to over 15 maf, an increase of about 14
percent,” between 1971 and 2010. 90 The apex occurred in 2000
and 2001—when demands exceeded 16 maf—but the historic
drought’s onset in 2000 resulted in these levels falling to
slightly above 15 maf by 2010. 91 More important than the apex
are the facts that annual demands exceeded supplies on
average for the first time in the basin’s history during the late
1990s, and that this pattern has persisted across the past
88. See also STUDY REPORT, supra note 6, at SR-4 fig.1 (depicting pattern on
annual basis).
89. See generally TRIBUTARIES APPENDIX, supra note 87, at C11-9 to -16
(identifying historical consumptive uses and losses along Lower Basin
tributaries).
90. TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 35, at C-6.
91. Id. at C-8 fig.C-3; see also U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, SECURE
WATER ACT SECTION 9503(C)—RECLAMATION CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER 2016
3-1 (2016), http://www.usbr.gov/climate/secure/docs/2016secure/2016SECURE
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU6J-H2UZ] (noting basinwide consumptive uses
and losses averaged approximately 15.0 maf from 2000 to 2012).

8. 88.3 ROBISON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

498

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

4/10/2017 7:26 PM

[Vol. 88

decade. 92 With regard to water uses, two patterns are notable:
(1) an increase in municipal and industrial uses stemming from
population growth, and (2) a stabilization and recent reduction
in agricultural uses due to drought. 93 Whether deemed credible
or not, 94 the Basin Study suggested these trends will not abate.
As Figure 2 generally displays, the study projected basinwide
consumptive uses and losses—again, excluding Lower Basin
tributaries—ranging from 17.7 to 20.1 maf by 2060, and
involving overall increases in municipal and industrial
demands and corresponding decreases in agricultural
demands. 95
The water supply picture in the Colorado River Basin looks
much different. It, of course, implicates climate change, both
historical and future. Flow levels at Lee Ferry are a critical
metric in this regard because roughly 92 percent of the basin’s
natural flow—as measured at Imperial Dam above the Gila
River’s mouth—originates upstream of Lee Ferry in the Upper
Basin. 96
Figure 2 depicts the historical supply situation on a
decadal basis. Drawing on a historical record from 1906 to
2015, natural flows at Lee Ferry averaged approximately 14.8
maf per year. 97 As mentioned earlier, the period from 2000 to
2015 has been “the driest 16-year period in the past 100 years
and one of the driest 16-year periods in the past 1,200 years.”98
More specifically, figures from the Upper Colorado River
Commission estimate natural flows at Lee Ferry averaged
roughly 12.44 maf per year from 2000 to 2015. 99 The
temperature trend noted above bears directly on this pattern.
From 1895 to 2005, average surface air temperature in the
92. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-5 fig.1-2.
93. TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 35, at C-8 fig.C-3, C-9 fig.C-4. Drought
has reduced water availability and thus contributed to decreases in basinwide
agricultural use. Id. at C-8 fig.C-3.
94. See Baker Letter, supra note 10, at 2 (describing water demand forecasts
as “inflated”).
95. For more detailed descriptions of these projections, see TECHNICAL
REPORT C, supra note 35, at C-23, C-25 fig.C-8, C-30 fig.C-12, C-32 fig.C-13.
96. TECHNICAL REPORT B, supra note 8, at B-22.
97. Open Data, supra note 9; see also UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at
25 tbl.3 (indicating natural flows at Lee Ferry averaged 14.6 maf from 1896 to
2015). These flows were highly variable, ranging from 5.6 maf in 1977 to 25.2 maf
in 1984. TECHNICAL REPORT B, supra note 8, at B-22.
98. Open Data, supra note 9.
99. UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at 25 tbl.3.
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basin rose 2.5 degrees Fahrenheit (1.39 degrees Celsius), with
a roughly 2.0 degree Fahrenheit (1.11 degree Celsius) increase
occurring between 1970 and 2005. 100 No significant long-term
annual precipitation trend is apparent, but “annual variability
appears to be increasing.” 101
Looking ahead, one of the Basin Study’s four projection
scenarios, the Downscaled GCM Scenario, addressed climate
change’s potential impacts on basinwide water supplies. A
“strong continued warming” trend appears in this scenario. 102
It involves a median increase in annual temperature of about
2.34 degrees Fahrenheit (1.3 degrees Celsius) by 2025, 4.32
degrees Fahrenheit (2.4 degrees Celsius) by 2055, and 5.94
degrees Fahrenheit (3.3 degrees Celsius) by 2080, with the
Upper Basin projected to warm more than the Lower Basin.103
As for average annual precipitation, the projections do not
suggest a basinwide trend, but decreases of up to 10% are
anticipated in much of the Lower Basin, while increases of up
to 10% are expected in the Upper Basin, across the latter half
of the century. 104 Ultimately, the mean projection in the
Downscaled GCM scenario is that natural flows at Lee Ferry
will average 13.7 maf annually from 2011 to 2060—an 8.7%
decrease from observed flows in the historical record—although
the Basin Study also described “the median of the projections is
nearly 1.0 maf lower (annual flow of around 12.7 maf) than the
mean.” 105 Notwithstanding these mean and median figures, the
Basin Study acknowledged, “[r]ecent studies have postulated
that the average yield of the Colorado River could be reduced
by as much as 20 percent due to climate change,” 106 and
researchers have suggested reductions ranging from 6% to 45%
by 2050. 107
In sum, the Basin Study marked “the next logical step” 108
in five decades of studies reflecting persistent concerns over
100. TECHNICAL REPORT B, supra note 8, at B-16 fig.B-7.
101. Id. at B-16.
102. Id. at B-51.
103. Id. at B-51 to -52, B-53 fig.B-37, B-54 fig.B-38.
104. See id. at B-52, B-54 fig.B-38, B-55 fig.B-39 (addressing projected
precipitation from 2041 to 2095).
105. Id. at B-65. The median is subsequently noted in tabular form as 13.6
maf. Id. at B-81 tbl.B-2.
106. STUDY REPORT, supra note 6, at SR-6.
107. Baker Letter, supra note 10, at 1.
108. STUDIES SUMMARY, supra note 84, at SR3-12.
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water supply and demand imbalances within the Colorado
River Basin. As highlighted above, steadily increasing demands
since publication of Meyers’s scholarship resulted, for the first
time in the basin’s history, in average annual demands
exceeding supplies over the past two decades, initially in the
late 1990s followed by a rebound, and consistently across the
past decade during the historic drought. When the drought will
relent, and what “normal” flows will look like moving forward,
are clutch matters for the imbalance’s future scope. That said,
the unprecedented intersection and inversion of the supply and
demand lines in recent years alone underpins this section’s
heading of “point tipping.” This reality is the Law of the River’s
legacy—the heritage of a labyrinthine body of laws whose
potency in molding our socio-ecological systems within and
adjacent to the basin ironically correlates with widespread
cultural invisibility and misunderstanding regarding the
content and operation of these laws. The next Part aims, in
some small measure, to lift this veil.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL & INTERSTATE
ALLOCATION FRAMEWORK
The Colorado River Basin and Law of the River share a
reciprocal relationship. While the Law of the River has
facilitated the vast scope of changes in and around the basin
touched on above, these changes likewise have spurred the Law
of the River’s development in myriad ways detailed below.
Given this dynamic, any attempt to chronicle how the Law of
the River has evolved since Meyers’s scholarship necessarily
involves some narrowing. In this case, my coverage is woven
around the unabating topic of apportionment that five decades
ago drove Meyers’s work. As mentioned earlier, Meyers’s
articles appeared at a key point in the Law of the River’s
history, emerging between the Supreme Court’s Arizona v.
California decision in 1963 and Congress’s passage of the
Colorado River Basin Project Act in 1968. While the latter
shored up an infrastructural and operational base, the former
announced (or arguably clarified) the fourth and final
apportionment of the international and interstate allocation
framework. Meyers again illuminated the legal histories,
doctrinal features, and perplexities of this framework’s nested
apportionments in the U.S.-Mexico Treaty, Colorado River
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Compact, Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (Upper Basin
Compact), and Arizona v. California decree.
This Part revisits these apportionments fifty years later. It
clarifies precisely how they have adapted to the changes
discussed in the previous Part, particularly throughout the
historic drought. Taken together, these adaptations reveal an
iterative wave of common patterns. Alluded to in the
Introduction, Part IV synthesizes these patterns from
retrospective and prospective angles. In short, they encompass
the diverse milestones chronicled in the pages that follow,
including the formulation of reservoir operating regimes as
tools for implementing the apportionments and managing
conflicts surrounding their core provisions, as well as the
proliferation of measures aimed at avoiding or mitigating
constraints on consumptive use along the Lower Colorado
River. These are the prevalent threads to discern within the
weave.
A.

U.S.-Mexico Treaty

“Certainly we should deal with Mexico as a friend and not
at arm’s length. But when we make a treaty about water, we
are dealing with the lifeblood of the West and shaping its whole
destiny.” 109 Former President Herbert Hoover offered these
remarks in 1945 during senatorial debates over ratification of a
treaty governing the Colorado River that had been formed by
U.S. and Mexican diplomats the year prior. 110 The treaty
prescribes an international apportionment that has evolved in
a host of ways since its inception. Given this Article’s focus on
the Law of the River’s international and interstate allocation
framework, the material below outlines the apportionment and
addresses the emergence in recent years of binational shortage
sharing and water storage arrangements designed to
implement and navigate the apportionment in the face of low
flows and reservoir levels. As will become clear, these
arrangements stem directly from the historic drought and
109. RAY LYMAN WILBUR & NORTHCUTT ELY, THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS
159
(1948),
http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/LawOfTheRiver/
HooverDamDocs/HooverDam1948.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB3L-4PVB] [hereinafter
HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS].
110. Treaty, supra note 19. The treaty also governs the Rio Grande and the
Tijuana River. Id.
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persistent treaty ambiguities elucidated expertly by Meyers
fifty years ago.
1. International Apportionment
By signing the U.S.-Mexico Treaty on February 3, 1944,
“the two countries . . . ended nearly a half century of
controversy by agreeing to divide the waters of the Colorado
River.” 111 Complementing Meyers’s insightful co-authored
piece, the premier Colorado River historian, the late Norris
Hundley, Jr., produced rich scholarship on the treaty’s
protracted consummation. 112 As eventually forged two decades
following the Colorado River Compact’s drafting in 1922, the
treaty’s international apportionment did not—at least
according to former President Hoover—resemble anything the
compact negotiators had envisioned. 113 Nonetheless, the
apportionment has remained durable for over seventy years,
imposing on the United States a “national obligation”114
regarded as the Law of the River’s highest priority. 115
Article 10 of the treaty is the international
apportionment’s core. 116 It provides Mexico with a perpetual,
quantified apportionment of Colorado River water and imposes
a corresponding delivery obligation on the United States. In
relevant part, Article 10(a) states: “Of the waters of the
Colorado River, from any and all sources, there are allotted to
Mexico . . . [a] guaranteed annual quantity of 1,500,000 acrefeet . . . to be delivered in accordance with the provisions of
Article 15.” 117 The apportionment’s volume and delivery
obligation’s perceived static nature were the fodder of
President Hoover’s critiques during the ratification debates.118
He advocated instead for a pro-rata apportionment, but this
111. Norris Hundley, Jr., The West Against Itself: The Colorado River—An
Institutional History, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR ISSUES
FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 9, 25 (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., 1986).
112. See generally id. at 25–28; NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., DIVIDING THE WATERS:
A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (1966)
(chronicling treaty formation).
113. HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, supra note 109, at 161.
114. Colorado River Basin Project Act § 202, 43 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012).
115. MacDonnell, supra note 11, at 21.
116. See Meyers & Noble, supra note 14, at 388–93 (surveying treaty’s
Colorado River provisions).
117. Treaty, supra note 19, at art. 10(a).
118. HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, supra note 109, at 161.
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advocacy did not take hold.
Yet the international apportionment does not wholly
disregard allocational flexibility and risk. Article 10(b)
contemplates augmentation and diminution of treaty
deliveries. 119 Regarding the latter, Article 10(b) addresses
treaty delivery reductions as follows:
In the event of extraordinary drought or serious accident to
the irrigation system in the United States, thereby making
it difficult for the United States to deliver the guaranteed
quantity of 1,500,000 acre-feet . . . a year, the water allotted
to Mexico . . . will be reduced in the same proportion as
consumptive uses in the United States are reduced. 120

Given the historic drought and projected climate changebased reductions in Lee Ferry flows, this text is critically
important from an evolutionary perspective. Import does not
equate with clarity, however, and this disjuncture has been the
mother of invention.
2. Of “Extraordinary Drought” & Other Perplexities
“There has, as yet, been no controversy between the United
States and Mexico over the ‘extraordinary drought’
provision . . . . It takes little imagination, however, to foresee
conflict if Mexico’s deliveries are ever cut to less than 1.5
million acre-feet on the basis of article 10.” 121 Meyers made
this remark in 1967, and both aspects of it ring true today. The
United States has yet to invoke Article 10(b) to reduce treaty
deliveries, including in response to the historic drought, and
serious questions exist as to whether it can ever serve as a
viable drought response mechanism. Three other seasoned Law
of the River students shared Meyers’s skepticism: President
Hoover, Norris Hundley, Jr., and Northcutt Ely, lead counsel to
the State of California in Arizona v. California and Executive
Assistant to Interior Secretary Ray Lyman Wilbur during the

119. Treaty, supra note 19, at art. 10(b). With regard to augmentation, the
United States has committed to delivering up to 1.7 maf of treaty water annually,
albeit with no vesting of rights to augmented flows. Id.
120. Id.
121. Meyers & Noble, supra note 14, at 415.
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Hoover Administration. 122 To understand why, consider
Meyers’s analytical framework: “[D]eliveries to Mexico will be
reduced upon the occurrence of three conditions: (1)
‘extraordinary drought’ or ‘serious accident to the irrigation
system,’ (2) ‘difficulty’ in making deliveries, and (3) reductions
in consumptive uses in the United States.” 123
What constitutes an “extraordinary drought” under Article
10(b)? A definition of the term does not appear in the treaty,
and the historical record strongly suggests the drafters did not
share a common understanding. As revealed by Hundley, U.S.
State Department officials “eventually admitted that the treaty
negotiators had made no attempt to agree on the meaning of
‘extraordinary drought’ or on who was to decide when such a
drought had occurred.” 124 At least two longstanding issues thus
plague Article 10(b). One concerns the spatial and temporal
characteristics for deeming a drought “extraordinary.” 125 The
other is procedural: By whom, and through what processes, is
this determination to be made? 126
Similar challenges extend from Article 10(b)’s other
operative phrases outlined by Meyers. Not only does the
provision hinge treaty delivery reductions on an extraordinary
drought (or serious accident to the U.S. irrigation system), it
also requires the event make it “difficult for the United States
to deliver the guaranteed quantity of 1,500,000 acre-feet.” 127
Again, by whom, and through what processes, is “difficulty” to
be assessed? 128 Further, how does the contemporary existence
of over 60.0 maf of storage capacity in U.S. reservoirs bear on
this determination? 129 The latter consideration also plays into
122. See HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, supra note 109, at 161; HUNDLEY, supra
note 112, at 153, 167, 171; NORTHCUTT ELY, LIGHT ON THE MEXICAN WATER
TREATY FROM THE RATIFICATION PROCEEDINGS IN MEXICO: A REPORT TO THE
COLORADO
RIVER
WATER
USERS’
ASSOCIATION
14–19
(1946),
http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/LawOfTheRiver/MexicanTreatyEly1946
CRWUAocr.pdf [https://perma.cc/86VX-G6P2].
123. Meyers & Noble, supra note 14, at 411.
124. HUNDLEY, supra note 112, at 153.
125. For historically contrasting views on each dimension, see HUNDLEY, supra
note 112, at 153, 167 (spatial dimension), and Meyers & Noble, supra note 14, at
413 (temporal dimension).
126. HUNDLEY, supra note 112, at 153; see also ELY, supra note 122, at 14 (no
meeting of minds).
127. Treaty, supra note 19, at art. 10(b).
128. Meyers & Noble, supra note 14, at 414.
129. See MacDonnell, supra note 11, at 10 (noting 60.0 maf of storage
capacity).
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Article 10(b)’s text regarding treaty deliveries being “reduced in
the same proportion as consumptive uses in the United States
are reduced.” 130 The rub is that the Colorado River Storage
Project’s post-treaty construction suggests, “[i]f reservoirs in
the United States happen to be relatively full at the beginning
of the drought, it may take some time before low precipitation
and runoff are reflected in decreased use.” 131 At the end of the
day, all of these perplexities—as well as a host of vexing
compound
the
administrative
issues 132—significantly
“extraordinary drought” ambiguities.
“All told, it seems extremely unlikely that the United
States can, as a practical matter, ever expect to rely on article
10 to reduce deliveries to Mexico.” 133 This quote captures
Meyers’s view in the final analysis. “[A]s a working clause on
drought conditions, article 10 has little to recommend it,” he
opined, while adding on a realpolitik tip that “[a]s a clause
purporting to offer some relief for the upper state and thus
satisfying the local constituency, it may have served its
purpose.” 134 What should be done in this situation, especially
when the seemingly defunct provision addresses subjects like
shortage sharing and risk allocation that are critical in the face
of drought and climate change? Minute 319 reveals one
pragmatic option.
3. Minute 319: Pragmatism and Invention in Treaty
Implementation
In the context of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty and elsewhere,
minutes serve to implement treaty provisions, rather than to
amend them, 135 and Minute 319 performs exactly this function
130. Treaty, supra note 19, at art. 10(b).
131. Meyers & Noble, supra note 14, at 413.
132. Examples of such issues include the following. Which specific consumptive
uses must be accounted for when calculating the collective reduction of these uses
in the United States and proportionate treaty delivery reductions? Is it possible to
calculate, in an accurate and contemporaneous manner, the extent of reduced
consumptive uses in the United States to provide the necessary baseline for
proportionate treaty delivery reductions? Finally, if the answer to the previous
question is “no,” what time lag is inherent to this calculation, and how should it be
handled? See id. at 414 (discussing administrative issues).
133. Id. at 415.
134. Id.
135. Telephone Interview with Sally Spener, U.S. Sec’y, Int’l Boundary and
Water Comm’n (July 16, 2015) [hereinafter Spener Interview].
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with respect to treaty delivery reductions under the
international apportionment. By its terms, the Minute
disclaims affecting “the interpretation or application of the
provisions of Article 10(b) of the 1944 Water Treaty, including
reduction of water allotted to Mexico under Article 10(a).”136
Article 10 thus stands intact. For an interim period up to
December 31, 2017, however, Minute 319 implements
binational shortage sharing and water storage arrangements
that constitute novel, potentially long-term precedents for
navigating drought conditions without triggering Article
10(b). 137 Each arrangement is considered in turn below.
The gist of Minute 319’s shortage-sharing rules is that the
amount of treaty water delivered annually from the United
States to Mexico is permitted to diminish in sync with
projected declines in Lake Mead’s elevation. 138 More precisely,
Minute 319 establishes an incremental scale with three
elevation tiers for Lake Mead—1,075 feet, 1,050 feet, and 1,025
feet—and three corresponding levels of treaty delivery
reductions—50,000 acre-feet, 70,000 acre-feet, and 125,000
acre-feet—that will occur if the Bureau of Reclamation projects
Lake Mead’s elevation will be at or below these tiers as of
January 1 each year. 139 For example, if Lake Mead’s projected
elevation falls between 1,075 and 1,050 feet, treaty deliveries
will be reduced 50,000 acre-feet. The shortage-sharing rules
also require consultation between the U.S. Section of the
International Boundary and Water Commission and the
Bureau if Lake Mead’s elevation lies below 1,025 feet and is
projected to fall below 1,000 feet. 140
Minute 319’s shortage-sharing rules have not yet been
triggered, but two observations should be made. First, as
recently as August 2016, the Bureau of Reclamation’s

136. INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, MINUTE NO. 319: INTERIM
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE MEASURES IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN
THROUGH 2017 AND EXTENSION OF MINUTE 318 COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO
ADDRESS THE CONTINUED EFFECTS OF THE APRIL 2010 EARTHQUAKE IN THE
MEXICALI VALLEY, BAJA CALIFORNIA 19 (2012), https://www.ibwc.gov/
Files/Minutes/Minute_319.pdf [hereinafter MINUTE 319].
137. Id. at 3.
138. See id. at 6–7 (outlining shortage-sharing rules). These shortage-sharing
rules have domestic counterparts that preceded them by five years in the Lower
Basin. See infra section III.D.2.a.
139. Id. at 6.
140. Id. at 7.
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projections for Lake Mead’s elevation have suggested a
significant probability (upwards of sixty percent) of the
shortage-sharing rules being imposed over the next several
years. 141 Second, on July 1, 2016, Lake Mead’s actual (not
projected) elevation dropped to 1,071.61 feet—roughly threeand-a-half feet below the 1,075 feet shortage tier—marking the
lowest storage level since the reservoir’s filling in 1937. 142
Dovetailing with its shortage-sharing rules, Minute 319
also establishes what might be labeled an international water
banking scheme, although these terms intentionally were not
used in the Minute. 143 It affords Mexico flexibility in utilizing
treaty flows, including enabling Mexico to bolster Lake Mead’s
storage to avoid the shortage tiers. Minute 319’s general
approach is to allow Mexico to defer treaty deliveries in order
to store the unused water in Lake Mead. If these deferred
deliveries stem from Mexico’s inability to use the stored water
due to infrastructure repairs from a 2010 earthquake in
Mexicali Valley, the water is treated as “water deferred”
(colloquially, “earthquake water”). 144 Alternatively, if the
deferred deliveries are attributable to Mexico’s relying on
water yielded from conservation projects (e.g., canal lining) or
augmentation projects (e.g., desalination plants), the stored
water is considered “Intentionally Created Mexican Allocation”
(ICMA). 145 Notably, Minute 319 imposes limits on (1) Mexico’s
annual and cumulative creation of ICMA and water
141. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM:
PROJECTED FUTURE CONDITIONS 2016–2020, at 7 (2016), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
region/g4000/crss-5year.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GF7-EYE2] [hereinafter SHORTAGE
PROJECTIONS].
142. Henry Brean, Lake Mead Still Shrinking, but Lower Consumption Offers
Glimmer of Hope, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Aug. 6, 2016,
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/lake-mead-still-shrinking-lowerconsumption-offers-glimmer-hope [https://perma.cc/S3F7-4WTD].
143. Spener Interview, supra note 135.
144. See MINUTE 319, supra note 136, at 4 (outlining water deferred program).
Mexico can convert water deferred to ICMA. Id. at 8.
145. See id. at 7–10 (outlining ICMA program). Both aspects of this scheme
trace to Minute 319’s predecessors, Minute 317 and 318. Minute 318 allowed
treaty delivery deferrals of up to 260,000 acre-feet annually from 2010 to 2013. Id.
at 2–3. Minute 317 likewise contemplated Mexico possibly using U.S.
infrastructure to store water. INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, MINUTE NO.
317: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR U.S.-MEXICO DISCUSSIONS ON COLORADO
RIVER COOPERATIVE ACTIONS 2–3 (2010), http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/
Minute_317.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TWT-4QJ4]. The ICMA program also has roots
in an Intentionally Created Surplus program implemented domestically in the
Lower Basin. See infra section III.D.2.b.
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deferred, 146 and (2) annual amounts of ICMA and water
deferred delivered to Mexico, as well as the circumstances in
which such deliveries can be made. 147
Looking at Minute 319 in action, Mexico has yet to utilize
the ICMA program to store water in Lake Mead since the
Minute’s adoption in 2012, 148 but it has relied fairly
consistently on the water deferred program. Mexico’s deferred
delivery account balance was 230,528 acre-feet as of the
Bureau of Reclamation’s most recent water accounting report
in 2015, 149 and Mexico had stored 366,134 acre-feet of
earthquake water during the preceding four years. 150
Precisely what lies beyond the interim period’s close on
December 31, 2017, is unfolding at the time of this writing, but
Minute 319 expressly contemplates a “potential comprehensive
Minute” extending or replacing its “substantive provisions . . .
through no later than December 31, 2026.” 151 At the Colorado
River Water Users Association’s 2014 annual conference, U.S.
and Mexican officials publicly expressed interest in a successor
agreement, and dialogue regarding this “Minute 32x” is
ongoing. 152 As for its content, the binational shortage-sharing
146. MINUTE 319, supra note 136, at 8, 10.
147. Id.
148. Spener Interview, supra note 135.
149. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER ACCOUNTING AND
WATER USE REPORT: ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 28 tbl.9 (2015),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2015/2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5C98-NJT9] [hereinafter 2015 ACCOUNTING].
150. Id.; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER ACCOUNTING AND
WATER USE REPORT: ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 28 tbl.9 (2014),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2014/2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JEC-RS33] [hereinafter 2014 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE REPORT: ARIZONA,
CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 24 (2013), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/
4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2013/2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TLL-8WXJ] [hereinafter
2013 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER
ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE REPORT: ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 23
(2012),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2012/2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F26Y-WER8] [hereinafter 2012 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE REPORT: ARIZONA,
CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 23 (2011), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/
4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2011/2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/43WN-B9KX] [hereinafter
2011 ACCOUNTING].
151. MINUTE 319, supra note 136, at 3.
152. Spener Interview, supra note 135; Sally Spener, U.S. Sec’y, Int’l Boundary
and Water Comm’n, Minute 319 and Beyond: U.S.-Mexico Colorado River
Agreements
23–29
(Mar.
9,
2016),
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/
CF_CR_Colo_Agreements_030916.pdf [https://perma.cc/D28W-E8R4].
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and water storage programs foreseeably will continue in some
form, as much interest remains in avoiding (or postponing)
shortage-based treaty delivery reductions, and enjoying clarity
and certainty regarding shortage administration. 153 Taken
together, these programs constitute a novel approach to the
international apportionment, and the shortage-sharing rules
are particularly thought-provoking as a means for coping with
Article 10(b)’s arguably debilitating ambiguities. Similar
patterns can be discerned in the Colorado River Compact’s
evolution.
B.

Colorado River Compact

We now come to the “constitution,” “cornerstone,” and
“foundation” of the Law of the River. 154 “The Colorado Compact
was not found on a tablet written on Mount Sinai,” David
Brower once remarked, 155 but in many ways perception
appears to belie this truth. The Compact establishes an
apportionment for the portion of the Colorado River System
within the United States. It has neither been amended by
Congress, nor interpreted by the Supreme Court in an express,
dispositive manner, 156 since taking effect in 1929. Perhaps the
closest approximation of the latter traces to Meyers’s clerkship
with Special Master Simon Rifkind, whose Arizona v.
California report contains rich dicta on the Compact’s

153. Spener Interview, supra note 135; UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at
6.
154. Robert W. Adler, Revisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time for a
Change?, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19, 21 (2008) (constitution); U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, The Law of the River, http://www.usbr.gov/
lc/region/g1000/lawofrvr.html (last updated Mar. 2008) [https://perma.cc/6TG2N3XR] (cornerstone); James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on
California’s Claims to Water from the Colorado River Part I: The Law of the River,
4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 290, 292 (2001) (foundation).
155. MCPHEE, supra note 47, at 241.
156. The Supreme Court disclaimed Compact interpretation in the principal
case of Arizona v. California. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150, 166
(2006) (stating the decree shall not affect “[a]ny issue of interpretation of the
Colorado River Compact”) [hereinafter Decree]. The Court’s decision nonetheless
holds significant implications for the Compact’s apportionment. See generally
Jason A. Robison & Larry J. MacDonnell, Arizona v. California & the Colorado
River Compact: Fifty Years Ago, Fifty Years Ahead, 4 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
130 (2014) (examining Arizona v. California’s historical treatment of, and
contemporary implications for, the Compact).
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meaning.157 Yet the Compact’s apportionment actually has
evolved in recent years through the Colorado River
Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated
Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (Interim
Guidelines). While leaving intact the Compact’s framing
provisions, the guidelines implement the apportionment for an
interim period to avoid deep-rooted conflicts among the Basin
States over textual interpretations. This section begins with a
survey of the apportionment, then turns to ambiguities in the
“constitution,” and ultimately outlines how the Interim
Guidelines and a Basin States’ Agreement have emerged to
implement the Compact, and to avoid litigation over it, up to
December 31, 2025. 158
1. Domestic Basinwide Apportionment
Aspiring “to provide for the equitable division and
apportionment of the use of the waters of the Colorado
System,” 159 the Compact divides the Colorado River Basin into
the two sub-basins identified earlier, an “Upper Basin” and
“Lower Basin,” authorizing each sub-basin to consumptively
use a portion of Colorado River System water. 160 Structuring
the “two-basin” framework are operative terms that begin with
“Colorado River System”: “that portion of the Colorado River
and its tributaries within the United States of America.”161
This term delineates the water resources subject to the
Compact. As for the entities authorized to consumptively use
system water, the “Upper Basin” and “Lower Basin,” these

157. Simon H. Rifkind, Special Master, Report, Dec. 5, 1960, Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) 1960 Term (U.S.), at 138–51 [hereinafter Rifkind
Report]; see also Meyers, supra note 14, at 14–15 (describing report as perhaps
“most authoritative commentary” on Compact).
158. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, COLORADO RIVER
INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED
OPERATIONS
FOR
LAKE
POWELL
AND
LAKE
MEAD
(2007),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KFX-34Y4] [hereinafter INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD];
Agreement Concerning Colorado River Management and Operations (Apr. 23,
2007),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/DEIScomments/State/
BasinStates.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EUB-V2S4] [hereinafter Basin States’
Agreement]. This agreement appears as attachment A of the linked document.
159. Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. I.
160. See Meyers, supra note 14, at 12–18 (surveying Compact’s provisions).
161. Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. II(a).
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terms refer to geographic areas (again, sub-basins)
encompassing drainage areas within and export areas outside
the Colorado River Basin’s hydrological boundaries above and
below, respectively, Lee Ferry. 162 Closely related to these
definitions demarcating the sub-basins’ boundaries are the
terms “States of the Upper Division” (Colorado, New Mexico,
Utah, and Wyoming), 163 and “States of the Lower Division”
(Arizona, California, and Nevada). 164 These political groupings
are critical in relation to flow obligations imposed by the
Compact.
Article III puts the foregoing terms into motion. Five
paragraphs within it constitute the framing provisions of the
Compact’s apportionment: Articles III(a) through (e).
Articles III(a) and (b) establish apportionments for the
Upper and Lower Basins. Article III(a) apportions “from the
Colorado River System in perpetuity to the Upper Basin and to
the Lower Basin[,] respectively[,] the exclusive beneficial
consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum.” 165
Article III(b), in turn, augments the Lower Basin’s Article
III(a) apportionment, stating: “[i]n addition to the
apportionment in paragraph (a)[,] the Lower Basin is hereby
given the right to increase its beneficial consumptive use of
such waters by one million acre-feet per annum.” 166 Taken
together, these two paragraphs thus authorize the Upper and
Lower Basins to engage in “beneficial consumptive use” of 7.5
and 8.5 maf of water per year, respectively, from the Colorado
River System—16.0 maf in total.
Articles III(c) and (d), in turn, focus on flow obligations—
the former international, the latter domestic—and appear
adjacent to a water-hoarding prohibition in Article III(e).
Article III(c) is concerned with flow obligations tethered to
Mexico’s 1.5 maf treaty apportionment. 167 It provides that
treaty water “shall be supplied first from the waters which are
surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities
specified in [Articles III(a) and (b)].” 168 “[I]f such surplus shall

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. § 37-61-101, arts. II(f)–(g).
Id. § 37-61-101, art. II(c).
Id. § 37-61-101, art. II(d).
Id. § 37-61-101, art. III(a).
Id. § 37-61-101, art. III(b).
Treaty, supra note 19, at art. 10(a).
Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. III(c).

8. 88.3 ROBISON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

512

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

4/10/2017 7:26 PM

[Vol. 88

prove insufficient for this purpose,” Article III(c) states that
“the burden of such deficiency shall be equally borne by the
Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, and whenever necessary the
States of the Upper Division shall deliver at Lee Ferry water to
supply one-half of the deficiency.” 169 As Meyers highlighted
fifty years ago, bitter disputes attend this text. 170 As for Article
III(d), its flow obligation falls solely on the Upper Division
states, providing that these states “will not cause the flow of
the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of
75,000,000 acre-feet for any period of ten consecutive years
reckoned in continuing progressive series.” 171 Following these
provisions is Article III(e) and its water hoarding prohibition:
“The States of the Upper Division shall not withhold water,
and the States of the Lower Division shall not require the
delivery of water, which cannot reasonably be applied to
domestic and agricultural uses.” 172
While the foregoing paragraphs make up the foundation of
the Compact’s apportionment, two related provisions should be
mentioned. Article VII—the so-called “wild Indian article”173—
states tersely: “Nothing in this compact shall be construed as
affecting the obligations of the United States of America to
Indian tribes.” 174 Article VIII further provides in relevant part:
“Present perfected rights to the beneficial use of waters of the
Colorado River System are unimpaired by this compact.” 175
The Compact contemplates that water consumptively used by
holders of present perfected rights falls within the Article III(a)
169. Id.
170. Meyers, supra note 14, at 16–17, 24–25.
171. Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. III(d). The term “flow
obligation” is used as a shorthand for Article III(d)’s text. Others prefer “nondepletion requirement” or “non-depletion obligation” for reasons generally
pertaining to the Compact’s non-impairment of present perfected rights and the
basin’s uncertain future hydrology. See, e.g., Eric Kuhn, Risk Management
Strategies for the Upper Colorado River Basin 13 (Jan. 2, 2012),
http://103.46.239.148:8081/CRD.com/images/PDF/risk_mgmnt/kuhn_on_risk_mg_
strategies_of_the_ucrb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DN7S-AYW6]
(non-depletion
requirement).
172. Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. III(e).
173. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER
COMPACT AND THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST 211–12 (2d ed.
2009) (describing unflattering dialogue surrounding Article VII at Compact
negotiations).
174. Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. VII; see also Upper Basin
Compact, supra note 20, at art. XIX(a) (counterpart provision).
175. Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. VIII.
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apportionments and must be counted against the sub-basin in
which the use occurs. 176 The ambiguous meaning of “present
perfected rights,” however, serves as fodder for the discussion
below.
2. Ambiguities in the Law of the River’s Constitution
A host of structural issues and textual ambiguities afflict
the preceding provisions. Most fundamental in the structural
realm is the monumental fact that they were founded on
inordinately high flow estimates. As just one illustration,
comments from Arthur Powell Davis, U.S. Reclamation Service
Commissioner, to Arizona Congressman Carl Hayden in
January 1923 estimated average annual natural flows at Lee
Ferry of 18.1 maf based on the 1903 to 1920 period. 177 A stream
gauge actually was not installed until 1921 at Lees Ferry—a
gauging station two miles upstream of the Compact dividing
point of “Lee Ferry” 178—and the Upper Colorado River
Commission estimates from 1922 to 2015 natural flows at Lee
Ferry averaged 14.1 maf annually. 179 As noted earlier, the
Bureau of Reclamation similarly has reported these flows
averaging approximately 14.8 maf per year from 1906 to
2015. 180 At the end of the day, as Norris Hundley, Jr. aptly
summed it, “[t]he consequences of the compact remain with
us.” 181 This sentiment applies equally to the Compact’s text.
“[T]he 1922 compact solves some problems but leaves others
unsolved and, in fact, by its language creates problems that
have become the subject of continuing controversy.” 182 Meyers’s
assessment is durable five decades later. Much has been
written about the textual ambiguities and derivative conflicts,
and the material below sheds modest light in this realm. Its

176. Id. § 37-61-101, arts. III(a), VIII.
177. HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, supra note 109, at A48; see also CRGI REPORT,
supra note 38, at 70 (noting additional examples).
178. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE COLORADO RIVER DOCUMENTS
2008 at 2-9 to -10 (2010) (identifying gauging station’s location vis-à-vis Lee
Ferry).
179. UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at 22.
180. Open Data, supra note 9. See also UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at
25 tbl.3 (indicating natural flows at Lee Ferry averaged 14.6 maf annually from
1896 to 2015).
181. HUNDLEY, supra note 173, at 352.
182. Meyers, supra note 14, at 18.
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paramount goal is to clarify exactly how the Interim Guidelines
finesse particular ambiguities that have proven divisive since
the historic drought’s onset in 2000.
Beginning with Article III(a) and (b) and Article VIII, key
text bearing on the Upper and Lower Basins’ apportionments is
unclear and/or contested. A handful of examples suffice to
illustrate. They generally concern the terms “beneficial
consumptive use” and “present perfected rights” as well as the
hydrological scope of the “Colorado River System.”
Consider initially how “the compact does not define the
term ‘beneficial consumptive use’ as employed in apportioning
water between the basins,” 183 and how “the two basins disagree
over the meaning of this term.” 184 The critical difference
concerns whether reservoir evaporation—substantial on a
basinwide scale 185—constitutes “beneficial consumptive use.”
The Upper Basin Compact takes this approach, while the
Arizona v. California decree does not. 186 Again, the Compact’s
text is elusive.
In a similar vein, the Compact lacks a definition of
“present perfected rights” as it appears in Article VIII’s
reference to water rights “unimpaired by this compact.” 187 As
with the “beneficial consumptive use” definitional vacuum, the
Upper Division and Lower Division states diverge. The split is
over the date governing whether a water right qualifies as a
“present perfected right”: November 24, 1922 (Compact’s
signing date) per the Upper Basin Compact or June 25, 1929
(Compact’s effective date) per the Arizona v. California
decree. 188
Yet another ambiguity relates to the Compact’s
hydrological scope—namely, whether Article III(a) and (b)
apply to the use of groundwater hydrologically connected to
surface water (tributary groundwater) within the Colorado
183. Id. at 18–19.
184. Id. at 15.
185. See TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 35, at C-48 (noting average annual
reservoir evaporation of 2.0 maf between 1971 and 2010).
186. Compare Upper Basin Compact, supra note 20, at arts. V, VI (addressing
inflow-outflow measurement method and treatment of reservoir evaporation),
with Decree, supra note 156, at art. I(A) (defining “consumptive use” as
“diversions from the stream less such return flow thereto”).
187. Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. VIII.
188. Compare Upper Basin Compact, supra note 20, at art. IV(c) (signing date),
with Decree, supra note 156, at art. I(H) (effective date).
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River System. “The compact contains no express provision
regarding groundwater,” as explained by Meyers, although he
also highlighted how the Supreme Court had subjected
tributary groundwater use to the Arizona v. California decree
“with no more textual authority than there is in the
compact.” 189
Finally, notwithstanding its explicit definition of “Colorado
River System,” 190 an epic dispute also implicating the
Compact’s hydrological scope concerns whether Article III(a)
and (b) encompass and thus require accounting for water use
along Lower Basin tributaries—particularly, the Gila River.191
The State of Arizona unsuccessfully argued to the contrary in
Arizona v. California—with Special Master Rifkind rejecting
this argument per the Compact’s “plain words”—but this dicta
is not dispositive. 192
Turning to Article III(c) and (d), ambiguities of equal or
arguably greater importance stem from the flow obligations
imposed by these provisions. For reasons that will become
clear, my focus is on the former. As Meyers described, “[f]rom
the time of the signing of the Mexican treaty, if not long before,
there have been conflicting interpretations of article III(c).” 193
At the outset, Article III(c)’s flow obligation implicates the
foregoing issue of whether the Compact’s apportionment
encompasses the Gila River and other Lower Basin tributaries.
In this context, the query is whether tributary water must be
accounted for when assessing whether “surplus” or “deficiency”
conditions exist within the meaning of Article III(c). 194
A closely connected second ambiguity involves what water

189. Meyers, supra note 14, at 26.
190. See Compact, supra note 18, at art. II(a) (defining “Colorado River
System” as “that portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries within the
United States of America”).
191. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River,
56 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 424–25 (1985).
192. Rifkind Report, supra note 157, at 142.
193. Meyers, supra note 14, at 25. For an insightful discussion about the
contested nature of Article III(d)’s flow obligation, see COLORADO RIVER
GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, GETCHES-WILKINSON CENTER FOR NATURAL
RESOURCES, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, DOES THE UPPER BASIN HAVE A
DELIVERY OBLIGATION OR AN OBLIGATION NOT TO DEPLETE THE FLOW OF THE
COLORADO RIVER AT LEE FERRY? (2012), http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=books_reports_studies
[https://perma.cc/XB37-5QW8].
194. See, e.g., Getches, supra note 191, at 424–25.
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constitutes “surplus” for purposes of the provision. On one side,
the Upper Division states have contended surplus consists of
(1) water being used in the Lower Basin in excess of the 8.5
maf apportionment in Article III(a) and (b), or perhaps (2)
water above and beyond the 8.5 maf apportionment plus the
lesser of the Upper Basin’s consumptive use or its 7.5 maf
apportionment in Article III(a). 195 On the other side, the Lower
Division states have countered that surplus consists of water
within the Colorado River System in a given year exceeding the
aggregate 16.0 maf apportioned by Article III(a) and (b). 196
This divergence directly affects Article III(c)’s implementation.
A third ambiguity relates to evaporation and other losses
associated with treaty water—specifically, the Upper Division
states’ purported mandatory coverage of half of these losses
below Lee Ferry. 197 Does Article III(c) require such a carriage
water contribution? Predictably, the Lower Division states
have said “yes,” 198 while the Upper Division states have said
“no.” 199
Finally, a further divisive ambiguity concerns Article
III(c)’s implementation when surplus exists. If “surplus” indeed
consists of water within the Colorado River System in a given
year beyond the aggregate 16.0 maf apportioned by Article
III(a) and (b), does its existence alleviate the Upper Division
states’ obligation to contribute treaty flows? At least one Lower
Division state, Arizona, has argued otherwise: “[U]nder Article
III(c), the Compact requires the release of more than one-half of
the Mexican Treaty obligation from Lake Powell in surplus
years.” 200 An intertwined matter is whether Article III(c)’s
implementation in the event of surplus requires locating
precisely where within the Colorado River System the surplus
exists, such that it can be sourced as the first supply for treaty

195. See Lochhead, supra note 154, at 320 (first argument); Kuhn, supra note
171, at 34 (second argument).
196. W. Patrick Schiffer et al., From a Colorado River Compact Challenge to
the Next Era of Cooperation Among the Seven Basin States, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 217,
222, 226 (2007).
197. Meyers, supra note 14, at 17.
198. See, e.g., Schiffer et al., supra note 196, at 225.
199. See, e.g., John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contrary Views of the Law
of the Colorado River: An Examination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower
Basins, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 21, § 21.05[2][c] (1986).
200. Schiffer et al., supra note 196, at 226.
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deliveries. 201
Volumes more could be said about the Compact
ambiguities, but this gloss hopefully conveys the basic point
that the Compact’s meaning is contested. “No doubt it would be
ungrateful to remark that perhaps speedy agreement was
bought at the price of clarity of meaning,” wrote Meyers in The
Colorado River, “but the fact remains that many observers are
uncertain in their understanding of the document.” 202 To this
insight Meyers added regarding the “beneficial consumptive
use” and Article III(c) ambiguities, “[t]hey are all disputes of
which the compact negotiators were aware but failed to resolve
because of imperfections of language and perhaps because of an
underlying lack of agreement.” 203 The ambiguities’ persistence
since Meyers’s scholarship itself is a noteworthy characteristic
of the allocation framework’s evolution over the past fifty
years. Even more important for this discussion, however, is the
historic drought’s accentuation of tensions over the ambiguities
during the past decade, and the Interim Guidelines’ emergence
as a mechanism for temporarily navigating these tensions.
3. Pragmatism Redux: Interim Guidelines &
Compact Implementation
The Compact ambiguities are relevant systemically within
the Law of the River. This observation brings us back to the
Colorado River Basin Project Act. Section 602(a) of the Act
directs the Secretary of the Interior to establish Long-Range
Operating Criteria for reservoirs constructed under the
Boulder Canyon Project Act (Lake Mead) and Colorado River
Storage Project Act (Lake Powell and its counterparts).204
Initially adopted in 1970, these criteria govern storage in
Upper Basin reservoirs and releases from Lake Powell.205
Section 602(a) sets an order of priority around which the
Secretary must frame the criteria. Designated as first and
Kuhn, supra note 171, at 34 n.68.
Meyers, supra note 14, at 12.
Id. at 18.
Colorado River Basin Project Act § 602(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (2012).
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, CRITERIA FOR COORDINATED LONGRANGE OPERATION OF COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS PURSUANT TO THE
COLORADO RIVER BASIN PROJECT ACT OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1968 (June 8, 1970),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/opcriter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VCU6ZW5E] [hereinafter LROC].
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
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second priorities, respectively, are Lake Powell releases needed
to satisfy the Upper Division states’ flow obligations to Mexico
and the Lower Division states under Articles III(c) and (d) of
the Compact. 206 Section 602(a) further designates as a third
priority storage of water not required for such releases to the
extent that the Secretary finds it “reasonably necessary to
assure deliveries” for the first and second priorities. 207 In this
precise way, Article III(c)’s ambiguities interface directly with
section 602(a) and the Long-Range Operating Criteria, thereby
prompting conflicts that trace back decades regarding whether
reservoir operations comport with the Compact. An especially
heated subject has been the criteria’s specification of a
minimum objective release of 8.23 maf per year from Lake
Powell. 208 Inclusion of Article III(c) treaty flows within this
8.23 maf release has been the sticking point. Simply put,
“based on their view of the Mexican Treaty obligation, the
[s]tates of the Upper Division believe that 8.23 maf is not
justified,” 209 while the Lower Division states have taken the
opposite stance. 210
Signed by Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne on
December 13, 2007, the Interim Guidelines “implement” the
Long-Range Operating Criteria up to December 31, 2025. 211
These guidelines and an accompanying Basin States’
Agreement prescribe the existing approach to the historic
conflicts over Article III(c) and concomitantly section 602(a) of
the Colorado River Basin Project Act. Numerous sources shed
light on the context surrounding the guidelines’ formation. 212 It
suffices to say, however, that the historic drought’s drastic
impact on reservoir storage during the first several years
206. Colorado River Basin Project Act § 602(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1)–(2)
(2012).
207. Id. § 602(a)(3).
208. LROC, supra note 205, at art. II(2).
209. Kuhn, supra note 171, at 29. The 8.23 maf release is commonly described
as encompassing 750,000 acre-feet of Article III(c) treaty flows. See, e.g., Schiffer
et al., supra note 196, at 225. This accounting, however, is not uniformly agreed
upon. Telephone Interview with John Shields, Agric. Eng’r, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, Lower Colo. Reg’l Office, former Interstate Streams Eng’r, Wyo.
State Eng’r’s Office (1984–2014) (Aug. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Shields Interview I].
210. See, e.g., Schiffer et al., supra note 196, at 225.
211. INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 22, 57.
212. See generally Douglas L. Grant, Collaborative Solutions to Colorado River
Water Shortages: The Basin States’ Proposal and Beyond, 8 NEV. L.J. 964 (2008)
(illuminating guidelines’ formation); Schiffer et al., supra note 196 (same).
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brought the Article III(c) and section 602(a) conflicts to a
boil, 213 and that these conflicts gradually simmered beginning
in 2005 with the Basin States’ engagement in a National
Environmental Policy Act process commenced by Secretary of
the Interior Gale Norton. Shortly after engaging in this
process, the states realized they would need to set aside their
differences over Article III(c) and section 602(a) to prepare a
proposal that might shape the guidelines’ makeup under a
timeline set by the Secretary. 214
Relevant to the Compact’s apportionment, the specific
manner in which the Interim Guidelines implement the LongRange Operating Criteria—and thus section 602(a) of the
Colorado River Basin Project Act and ultimately Articles III(c)
and (d)—is through a coordinated operating regime for Lake
Powell and Lake Mead. 215 This regime establishes a four-tier
schedule for annual Lake Powell releases, with the release
amounts fluctuating based upon the relative elevations of Lake
Powell and Lake Mead. More specifically, Lake Powell’s
projected elevation as of January 1 each year determines the
applicable operational tier—“equalization tier,” “upper
elevation balancing tier,” “mid-elevation release tier,” or “lower
elevation balancing tier”—and the relationship between this
projected elevation and that of Lake Mead dictates the amount
of water released from Lake Powell within a range prescribed
for the particular tier. 216 For example, if Lake Powell’s
projected elevation lies between 3,525 and 3,575 feet, the
applicable tier is the mid-elevation release tier, and the annual
release from Lake Powell within this tier will be either (1) 7.48
maf if Lake Mead’s projected elevation is at or above 1,025 feet,
or (2) 8.23 maf if Lake Mead’s projected elevation is below

213. See INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 11 (describing risk of
basinwide litigation); Letter from the States of Colo., N.M., Utah and Wyo.
Governor’s Representatives on Colo. River Operations to Lower Div. State
Representatives
(Oct.
7,
2004),
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/
mtgs/04oct25/Attach_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DW4-7EZ4] (describing how
declining reservoir levels have raised fundamental issues related to Compact and
other parts of Law of the River—including “fundamental issue” of “whether a
deficiency exists under Article III(c)”—and expressing position that “because no
such deficiency has been shown to exist, the Upper Basin has no obligation in this
regard”).
214. Grant, supra note 212, at 979; Shields Interview I, supra note 209.
215. INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 49–53.
216. Id. at 50–53.
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1,025 feet. 217 Notably, annual Lake Powell releases may be as
low as 7.0 maf under this regime. 218
In adopting the coordinated operating regime, the Interim
Guidelines dealt carefully with the Article III(c) and section
602(a) conflicts, which also underpinned a complementary
Basin States’ Agreement already noted. While recognizing that
differences exist regarding the Law of the River’s
interpretation, “including . . . Section 602(a) of the Colorado
River Basin Project Act,” the guidelines reserved such disputes
from formal determination by the Secretary of the Interior.219
In lieu of a formal determination, “the Secretary will apply the
operational criteria in [the] Guidelines,” with corresponding
disclaimers that “[a]ctual operations under [the] Guidelines
shall not represent interpretations of existing law by the
Secretary,” and that Lake Powell releases pursuant to the
guidelines “shall not prejudice the position or interests of either
the Upper or Lower Division states . . . with respect to required
storage or deliveries of water” under the Law of the River.220
To a similar effect, the guidelines’ adoption activated a legal
agreement in which the Basin States “agreed to mandatory
consultation provisions to address future controversies on the
Colorado River through consultation and negotiation . . . before
resorting to litigation.” 221 The agreement expressed a “desire to
avoid judicial or administrative proceedings”—which were not
considered “preferred alternatives to the resolution of claims or
controversies concerning the law of the river” 222—and
prohibited parties from initiating such proceedings over inter
alia Article III(c) or section 602(a) prior to engaging in
mandatory consultation. 223
Eyeing the future, synced review and expiration timelines
apply to the Interim Guidelines and Basin States’ Agreement
over the next ten years. By no later than December 31, 2020,
the Secretary of the Interior will initiate “a formal review for
purposes of evaluating the effectiveness” of the Interim
Guidelines, consulting with the Basin States in this process. 224
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 50, 52.
Id. at 50, 52–53.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Basin States’ Agreement, supra note 158, at 10.
Id.
INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 56.
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The Basin States’ Agreement similarly calls for consultation by
this date regarding whether the agreement should be extended,
modified, or terminated. 225 Both documents are commonly
hinged to the Interim Guidelines’ general expiration on
December 31, 2025. 226
It is in the nuanced fashion detailed above that the
Compact’s Article III(c) and (d) flow obligations are being
implemented fifty years after The Colorado River.
Notwithstanding the persistence of unresolved ambiguities
associated with the Upper Basin and Lower Basin
apportionments as a stand-alone aspect of the Compact’s
history, a truly intricate legal construct has evolved involving
Article III(c) and (d), section 602(a) of the Colorado River Basin
Project Act, the Long-Range Operating Criteria, and, at the top
of the pile, the Interim Guidelines. Pending no changes
stemming from consultation during the interim period, 227 this
construct will continue to coordinate Lake Powell’s and Lake
Mead’s operations until December 31, 2025, with the
guidelines’ formal review slated to commence five years earlier
(though it may begin sooner). 228 Policymakers engaged in the
formal review—and also consultation regarding the Basin
States’ Agreement—foreseeably will have to revisit, in one form
or another, the Article III(c) and section 602(a) ambiguities. 229
The outcome of this dialogue remains to be seen. As described
eloquently after the first round of negotiations (i.e., the Interim
Guidelines’ formation), “a compact does not mark the final
stage of problem-solving, only the beginning,” and “[t]his has
certainly been true for the Colorado River Compact.” 230
225. Basin States’ Agreement, supra note 158, at 8.
226. INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 57; Basin States’
Agreement, supra note 158, at 13. To be clear, the Basin States’ Agreement’s
mandatory consultation provision states it will “survive for a period of five years
following the termination or expiration” of the agreement. Basin States’
Agreement, supra note 158, at 10.
227. See INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 55 (calling for initial
consultation if Lake Mead’s projected January 1 elevation is below 1,025 feet, and
additional consultation to discuss “further measures” if elevation appears likely to
fall below 1,000 feet).
228. See Kuhn, supra note 171, at 24 (anticipating negotiations will “start
much sooner”).
229. See id. at 29 (describing debate has been temporarily postponed by
Interim Guidelines, but when states resume negotiations “602(a) could resurface
as a very contentious issue”); Shields Interview I, supra note 209.
230. Patricia Mulroy, Collaboration and the Colorado River Compact, 8 NEV.
L.J. 890, 894 (2008).

8. 88.3 ROBISON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

522

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

C.

4/10/2017 7:26 PM

[Vol. 88

Upper Basin Compact

Governing Colorado River System water use upstream of
Lee Ferry is the second interstate compact subsumed within
the Law of the River: the Upper Basin Compact. Its 1948
genesis lies roughly equidistant between the Colorado River
Compact’s drafting in 1922 and the publication of Meyers’s
scholarship. A tight, nested relationship exists between the
compacts. The Upper Basin Compact outlines an
apportionment for the five states with territory in the Upper
Basin—primarily Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming,
but also Arizona to a limited extent. This scheme is rooted in
the 7.5 maf apportionment established for the Upper Basin in
Article III(a) of the Compact, yet it is also framed around the
flow obligations imposed on the Upper Division states by
Article III(c) and (d). Reconciliation of these key provisions in
modern times places the Upper Division states in a marginally
tighter space than has existed in the past. Avoiding a call on
the river rooted in the flow obligations (Compact call), and
resulting curtailments under Article IV of the Upper Basin
Compact, is and will remain a key priority. It is likewise a
priority that overlaps with maintaining Lake Powell’s storage
and protecting hydropower generation and associated revenues
at Glen Canyon Dam. Important administrative matters, too,
must be considered in relation to low flows and storage, and
thus the prospect of a Compact call and curtailment. These
concerns have shaped the evolutionary narrative in this realm,
which initially entails exploring the Upper Basin
apportionment.
1. Upper Basin Apportionment
The Upper Basin Compact is inseverable from its
predecessor, the Compact, and in multiple respects the
instruments’ core provisions track one another. 231 One shared
feature relates to the Upper Basin Compact’s first stated
purpose: “equitable division and apportionment of the use of
the waters of the Colorado River System, the use of which was
apportioned in perpetuity to the Upper Basin by the Colorado
231. See Meyers, supra note 14, at 31–37 (surveying Upper Basin Compact’s
provisions).
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River Compact.” 232 Dovetailing with this purpose is a
successive one further revealing the compacts’ nestedness: “to
establish the obligations of each State of the Upper Division
with respect to the deliveries of water required to be made at
Lee Ferry by the Colorado River Compact.” 233 To a similar
effect, the Upper Basin Compact incorporates the Compact’s
operative terms, including “Colorado River System,” “Upper
Basin,” “Lower Basin,” “States of the Upper Division,” and
“States of the Lower Division.” 234 In short, the Upper Basin
Compact is designed to be congruent with the Compact, and
the instruments commonly focus on effecting equitable
apportionments within their overlapping spheres.
Article III of the Upper Basin Compact contains its
apportionment, marking another commonality with the
Compact in form, though not in substance. Article III initially
apportions from the Upper Colorado River System 50,000 acrefeet of consumptive use per year to Arizona. 235 After this
quantity-based apportionment, Article III establishes percentbased apportionments for the Upper Division states. Colorado,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming are entitled to the
consumptive use of 51.75%, 11.25%, 23%, and 14%,
respectively, of the “total quantity of consumptive use per
annum apportioned in perpetuity to and available for use each
year by [the] Upper Basin under the Colorado River Compact”
(i.e., after deducting Arizona’s 50,000 acre-feet). 236 Inclusion of
the phrase “available for use” in this text is critical. It reveals
the reason for the percent-based apportionments—namely,
“uncertainty about how much water will ultimately be
available under the Colorado River Compact” 237 after the
Upper Division states have satisfied their Article III(c) and (d)
flow obligations. Thus, “the allocation of each Upper Division
state is uncertain and variable.” 238 Regarding how
“consumptive use” is measured for the apportionment, the
compact employs an “inflow-outflow method” 239 that charges
reservoir evaporation against the states’ apportionments as
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Upper Basin Compact, supra note 20, at art. I.
Id.
Id. at arts. II(a), (c), (d), (f), (g).
Id. at art. III(a)(1).
Id. at art. III(a)(2).
Lochhead, supra note 154, at 319.
Id.
Upper Basin Compact, supra note 20, at art. VI.
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noted earlier. 240
Closely linked with the foregoing apportionment, the
Upper Basin Compact in Article IV establishes a system for
curtailing the Upper Division states’ consumptive use to ensure
“the flow at Lee Ferry shall not be depleted below that required
by Article III of the Colorado River Compact.” 241 As observed
by Meyers, Article IV is “extremely important because it
provides the formula and mechanism for curtailing
consumption if a drought should make it impossible for the
[Upper Division states] to meet [the] Lee Ferry delivery
obligation and still maintain existing uses.” 242
Overall, Article IV puts into place a two-tier curtailment
system for the Upper Division states. It calls for initial
curtailments accounting for any state’s exceedance of its
apportionment over the preceding ten years, 243 followed by
subsequent curtailments generally imposed on a pro-rata basis
across the states as a group. 244 Notably, the provision
governing the latter curtailments excludes from the pro-rata
calculation present perfected rights—that is, “uses of water
under rights perfected prior to November 24, 1922” (again, the
Compact’s signing date). 245 As Meyers explained, this exclusion
“was probably thought to be necessary because of article VIII of
the 1922 compact, which declared ‘present perfected rights’ to
be unimpaired by the agreement.” 246 Article IV’s
administration rests with the Upper Colorado River
Commission. In line with the two-tier system, “the extent of
curtailment by each State . . . shall be in such quantities and at
such times as shall be determined by the Commission.”247
Additional details regarding Article IV appear below to further
elucidate the contemporary relevance of potential curtailments
to the Upper Division states, individually and collectively,

240. Id. at art. V(a)–(b); see also Meyers, supra note 14, at 34 (describing
accounting of reservoir evaporation as “substantial advance” over Compact and
Arizona v. California decree).
241. Upper Basin Compact, supra note 20, at art. IV.
242. Meyers, supra note 14, at 32.
243. Upper Basin Compact, supra note 20, at art. IV(b).
244. Id. at art. IV(c).
245. Id.
246. Meyers, supra note 14, at 33 n.134.
247. Upper Basin Compact, supra note 20, at art. IV. The Commission,
however, does not possess authority to enforce curtailment orders. Meyers, supra
note 14, at 34.
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under this keystone provision.
2. Compact Calls & Curtailments
“How to build a future on the right to leftovers?” 248 Meyers
and his co-author David Getches, the late Dean of the
University of Colorado Law School, posed this “ultimate
question” for the Upper Basin twenty years after The Colorado
River. 249 They are certainly not the only Law of the River
students (experts, truly) to have raised it. 250 The discussion
above hopefully makes sense of why that is. Notwithstanding
the diverse values supported by non-consumptive water use
within the Upper Basin, the extent of consumptive use the
Upper Division states are legally capable of undertaking hinges
directly on what remains after the Compact’s Article III(c) and
(d) flow obligations have been met. The Upper Basin Compact
apportions these very leftovers. And demands for them have
increased steadily since Meyers’s scholarship, from
approximately 3.4 maf in 1971 to 3.9 maf in 2014. 251 The Basin
Study projected this pattern will continue for the next halfcentury, with Upper Basin consumptive uses ranging from
slightly below 5.0 maf to approximately 6.0 maf by 2060,
excluding reservoir evaporation. 252 Just as the Compact flow
obligations factor into the realism of these projections, so too do
climate change’s future impacts on Lee Ferry flows. What
appears clear retrospectively is that the Upper Division states
gradually have moved closer toward the outer bounds of their
248. David H. Getches & Charles J. Meyers, The River of Controversy:
Persistent Issues, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR ISSUES FOR
THE NEXT CENTURY 51, 56 (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., 1986).
249. Id.
250. See Lochhead, supra note 154, at 310 (describing one problem for Upper
Basin apportionment was “how to handle the ‘leftovers’ from the Upper Basin
supply after it had met its obligation under Article III(d)” of the Compact).
Getches’s seminal work includes David H. Getches, Colorado River Governance:
Sharing Federal Authority as an Incentive to Create a New Institution, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 573 (1997); Getches, supra note 191.
251. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN
CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES REPORT AS REVISED AFTER PEER REVIEW 1971–
1995 5 tbl.UC-1, 6 tbl.UC-2 (identifying 441,900 acre-feet of mainstem reservoir
evaporation and 2.9514 maf of consumptive uses and non-mainstem reservoir
evaporation in 1971); 2015 CUL REPORT, supra note 71, at 11 tbl.UC-1, 15 tbl.UC5 (identifying 442,600 acre-feet of mainstem reservoir evaporation and 3.4526 maf
of consumptive uses and non-mainstem reservoir evaporation in 2014).
252. TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 35, at C-26 fig.C-9.
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apportionments, however vague these edges may be. 253 It is not
a situation comparable in scale and constraint to that of the
Lower Division states under the Arizona v. California decree.
But with a fair amount of variation across the group, the Upper
Division states generally are in a marginally tighter space than
historically has been the case with regard to the leftovers’
bounty. 254
Conveying the situation upstream of Lee Ferry in slightly
more detail, the Upper Division states’ consumption of the
leftovers has yet to precipitate a Compact call. Reflective of the
Article III(d) flow obligation, the Upper Colorado River
Commission maintains a progressive decadal total of Lee Ferry
flows, and from the historic drought’s onset in 2000 to 2015 it
ranged from approximately 84.8 to 102.6 maf. 255 The
Commission, therefore, has not been required during this
period or any other to administer Article IV curtailments under
the Upper Basin Compact. Nonetheless, in assessing the Upper
Basin apportionment’s evolution, the prospect of a Compact call
and curtailment has been a key dynamic that has driven
decision-making over the past decade and will continue to do
so. Further, intertwined with this dynamic is a premium on
maintaining Lake Powell’s storage to avoid reductions in Glen
Canyon Dam’s hydropower generation and associated revenues
used to fund projects and programs, including several in the
environmental realm. 256 But avoidance has not been the only
game in town. Curtailment administration efforts also have
been in play, both within the Upper Division states and to a
lesser extent at the interstate level. The material below offers a
glimpse of these developments associated with the Upper Basin
253. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER WATER SUPPLY AND
DEMAND STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT C app. C10 HISTORICAL CONSUMPTIVE USE
AND LOSS DETAIL BY STATE C10-1 to -9 (2012), https://www.usbr.gov/lc/
region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Technical%20Report%20C%20-%20Water%
20Demand%20Assessment/TR-C_Appendix10_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTD9B6US] (identifying states’ historical consumptive uses and losses).
254. See Jason Anthony Robison, Climate Change and Allocation Institutions
in the Colorado River Basin, in WESTERN WATER POLICY AND PLANNING IN A
VARIABLE AND CHANGING CLIMATE 289, 301 tbl.16.1, 302 tbl.16.2 (2016)
(analyzing states’ water budgets under Upper Basin Compact).
255. See UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at 26 tbl.4.
256. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, http://www.gcdamp.gov/faq.html (last visited Aug, 11,
2016) [https://perma.cc/ DL4G-9W3C] (discussing Glen Canyon Dam hydropower
generation and revenues for salinity control and environmental programs).
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apportionment—and, at bottom, the leftovers.
a. Administration: Article IV, PPRs &
Measurement Methods
How exactly does Article IV of the Upper Basin Compact
work? Because no Compact call has necessitated curtailments,
this provision has yet to be implemented, including being
interpreted in conjunction with its implementation. Different
approaches, of course, would “divide up the burden of
curtailment among the four Upper Division states in different
ways.” 257 Although not on the Upper Colorado River
Commission’s front burner at present, the need to develop
Article IV guidelines has been recognized, and pursued to an
extent, in recent years. Specifically, the Commission’s
Engineering Advisory Committee began efforts several years
ago to draft “Principles for Administration of Consumptive
Uses under the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact” that
would have set guidelines for Article IV’s administration.258
These efforts were eclipsed when formulation of drought
contingency plans—plans aimed at avoiding, rather than
administering, a Compact call and curtailment as described
below—assumed priority. 259 No doubt a slew of issues,
interpretive and otherwise, would need to be addressed to
implement Article IV. 260 Examples include: (1) To what extent
does the Compact govern groundwater rights such that they
would be subject to curtailment?, and (2) What is the actual
cutoff date under Article VIII of the Compact for segregating
present perfected rights to be left unimpaired in a
curtailment—November 24, 1922, per Article IV, or June 25,
1929, per the Arizona v. California decree? 261 The latter
question also speaks to an intrastate priority: the need for
accurate inventories of present perfected rights within Upper
Kuhn, supra note 171, at 12.
WYO. STATE ENG’R’S OFFICE, COLORADO RIVER COMPACT ADMINISTRATION
PROGRAM: CONSUMPTIVE USE DETERMINATION PLAN 5 (2008) [hereinafter SEO
PLAN].
259. Telephone Interview with Steve Wolff, Colo. River Coordinator, Wyo.
State Eng’r’s Office (Aug. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Wolff Interview I]; Shields
Interview I, supra note 209.
260. See SEO PLAN, supra note 258, at 5 (listing issues); Kuhn, supra note 171,
at 12–13 (discussing alternate Article IV approaches).
261. Decree, supra note 156, at art. I(H).
257.
258.
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Division states.
Also related to Compact call and curtailment
administration is a second line of developments involving water
banking and temporary transfers. These measures fall within
the demand management strand of avoidance measures
(drought contingency planning) as well, but their connection
with Article IV involves present perfected rights.
Put simply, the distribution of present perfected rights
within Upper Division states is precarious from a curtailment
risk perspective. As described by the Wyoming State Engineer’s
Office regarding that state’s distribution: “The majority of
agricultural water rights have priority dates prior to 24
November 1922. The majority of municipal and industrial
water rights have priority dates after 24 November 1922.”262
This pattern is not unique to the Cowboy State. Colorado’s
breathtaking Western Slope contains agricultural districts as
well as several municipalities with significant pre-1922
rights. 263 The same cannot be said, however, along the
populous Front Range, where a curtailment could severely
impact major municipal suppliers like Denver Water, whose
transmountain diversions rest on post-1922 rights. 264 And
Cheyenne and Denver are not anomalies. Post-1922 rights
likewise underpin transmountain diversions serving Salt Lake
City, Albuquerque, and Santa Fe. 265
Upper Division states have responded to this risk
allocation dynamic in recent years by mapping out water
banking and temporary transfer arrangements aimed at
insulating critical water uses dependent on post-1922 rights
from Compact calls and curtailments. 266 Holders of such rights
would be able to utilize these arrangements to access water
secured under pre-1922 rights during curtailments. The
genesis of these arrangements marks an important aspect of
intrastate curtailment preparation. Further, although efforts
thus far have taken place at the state level, it is possible that
262. SEO PLAN, supra note 258, at 9.
263. Kuhn, supra note 171, at 22.
264. Id. at 22–23.
265. Id. at 23. Transmountain diversions in Upper Division states ranged from
510,410 to 994,857 acre-feet annually between 1994 and 2015. UCRC 2015
REPORT, supra note 50, at 144.
266. See Kuhn, supra note 171, at 37–39 (Colorado water bank); SEO PLAN,
supra note 258, at 13, 19 (Wyoming temporary transfers). A Wyoming water bank
study is ongoing. Wolff Interview I, supra note 259.
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an integrated, multi-state bank may later emerge, 267 an idea
proposed in the Basin Study. 268
A final emergent administrative strand concerns
consumptive use measurements. At the interstate level, a
three-phase Upper Colorado River Commission Consumptive
Use Study is underway. Its aim is to review the Upper Division
states’ and Bureau of Reclamation’s methodologies for
measuring agricultural consumptive use in the Upper Basin,
and to evaluate possible utilization of remote sensing
technologies for this purpose. 269 These measurements are
considered essential to “[e]fficient administration of the
Colorado River Compact” as well as “any future negotiations on
shortage allocations.” 270 A Phase I report was released in 2013
identifying differences in the states’ and Bureau’s consumptive
use measurement methods, and recommending development of
a consistent protocol for the Upper Basin. 271 Three years later
a Phase II report appeared, generally addressing extended
climate stations, eddy covariance towers, and remote sensing of
irrigated areas throughout the Upper Basin. 272 Beyond these
interstate developments, individual Upper Division states have
worked for two decades on improving monitoring and
measurement of consumptive use of Colorado River System
water. 273 All of these steps serve to facilitate Article IV’s
administration.

267. Kuhn, supra note 171, at 39.
268. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY
AND DEMAND STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT F – DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIONS AND
STRATEGIES F-59 to -60 (2012), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/
crbstudy/finalreport/Technical%20Report%20F%20-%20Development%20of%
20Options%20and%20Stategies/TR-F_Development_of_Ops&Strats_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PJ3W-ECKU] [hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORT F].
269. URS, ASSESSING AGRICULTURAL CONSUMPTIVE USE INCLUDING REMOTE
SENSING OF ACTUAL EVAPOTRANSPIRATION IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER
BASIN, PHASE 2 REPORT ES-1 (2016) [hereinafter PHASE 2 REPORT]. Irrigated
agriculture accounts for more than eighty percent of Upper Basin consumptive
use. Id. at 1-3 to -4.
270. Id. at 1-3.
271. URS, ASSESSING AGRICULTURAL CONSUMPTIVE USE IN THE UPPER
COLORADO RIVER BASIN ES-2 to -6 (2013).
272. See PHASE 2 REPORT, supra note 269, at ES-1 to -5 (summarizing report’s
coverage and recommendations).
273. See SEO PLAN, supra note 258, at 4 (discussing Colorado’s Decision
Support Systems and Wyoming’s Consumptive Use Determination Plan).
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b. Avoidance: Drought Contingency Planning
Efforts to avoid a Compact call and curtailment—as well
as critical elevations at Lake Powell—have gained even more
traction over the past several years than the administrative
developments above. The Basin States’ Agreement seems to
have swayed these priorities. As described earlier, this
agreement does not preclude Compact litigation—including
over Article III(c)—between now and December 31, 2025. But it
does mandate consultation beforehand and is replete with text
askewing “judicial or administrative proceedings.” 274 The
collaborative nature of this agreement appears to have allayed
concerns in Upper Division states, at least to an extent, about a
Compact call being made while the Interim Guidelines are in
place. 275 A shift away from curtailment administration and
toward curtailment avoidance thus has occurred, with
“avoidance” encompassing the maintenance of Lake Powell’s
storage for hydropower generation and revenues and insurance
for the Article III(c) and (d) flow obligations. 276 “Drought
contingency planning” is the immediate means to these ends.277
Working through the Upper Colorado River Commission, the
Upper Division states have been developing a drought
contingency plan since June 2013 involving three components:
(1) augmentation, (2) extended and coordinated reservoir
operations, and (3) voluntary demand management. 278
Neither the augmentation nor reservoir operation
components of the plan require detail. Weather modification is
the former’s focus. 279 And the latter calls for a “uniform plan”
for extending and coordinating operations of the large-scale
Colorado River Storage Project infrastructure: Glen Canyon
Dam and Lake Powell, Flaming Gorge Dam and Reservoir,
Navajo Dam and Reservoir, and the Aspinall Unit. 280 The
274. Basin States’ Agreement, supra note 158, at 10.
275. Shields Interview I, supra note 209.
276. Wolff Interview I, supra note 259.
277. Drought contingency planning falls within a suite of ongoing efforts—key
elements of which are the Basin Study and its Moving Forward program—
addressing water management in and around the basin. See PHASE I REPORT,
supra note 5, at 2-3 to -5 (surveying efforts).
278. UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at 38.
279. Id. at 137 (containing resolution supporting expanded “geographical and
temporal extent of weather modification programs”).
280. Id.
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plan’s express goals are to (1) “[r]educe any long-term risk of
impairing annual consumptive uses due to compact
curtailments in the Upper Basin,” and (2) “[h]elp avoid or
mitigate impacts from Lake Powell reaching the critical,
minimum power pool elevation.” 281 A memorandum of
understanding is currently being drafted addressing the plan’s
operational details. 282
The drought contingency plan’s demand management
component is more nuanced. It concerns developing and
implementing “temporary, voluntary, compensated” demand
management programs within the Upper Basin. 283 Its goal
mirrors that of the reservoir operation plan: “to protect against
impacts from Lake Powell reaching critical elevations and to
help ensure ongoing compliance with the Colorado River
Compact without impairing the right to exercise any existing
water rights in the future.” 284 Demand management programs
may stem from three sources. The Basin Study and its Moving
Forward effort are an initial source. 285 A second source consists
of intrastate demand management measures in Upper Division
states 286 (e.g., intrastate water banking and temporary
transfer arrangements emerging to address the distribution of
pre- and post-1922 water rights). 287 In addition, a third source
involves pilot programs like the “Pilot System Conservation
Program” implemented in July 2014. 288 This program is a joint
281. Id.
282. Telephone Interview with Steve Wolff, Colo. River Coordinator, Wyo.
State Eng’r’s Office (Aug. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Wolff Interview II].
283. UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at 137.
284. Id.
285. Id. See TECHNICAL REPORT F, supra note 268, at F-22 to -27, F-38 to -46,
F-46 to -54, F-63 to -67 (addressing reuse, municipal and industrial water
conservation, agricultural water conservation, and water transfers, exchanges,
and banking).
286. UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at 137.
287. See supra section III.C.2.a.
288. UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at 137; see generally AGREEMENT
AMONG THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE CENTRAL ARIZONA WATER
CONSERVATION DISTRICT, THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA, DENVER WATER, AND THE SOUTHERN NEVADA WATER AUTHORITY,
FOR A PILOT PROGRAM FOR FUNDING THE CREATION OF COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM
WATER THROUGH VOLUNTARY WATER CONSERVATION AND REDUCTIONS IN USE
(July
30,
2014),
http://cwcb.state.co.us/Documents/ShortTermHomePage/
25fundingagreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2ST-UNXB] [hereinafter CRSCP
Agreement]; see also Pilot System Conservation Program (Pilot Program), U.S.
BUREAU
OF
RECLAMATION,
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/
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effort of the Bureau of Reclamation and four municipal
suppliers: Denver Water in the Upper Basin, and the Central
Arizona Water Conservation District (again, CAWCD),
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD),
and Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) in the Lower
Basin. 289 Under the program, agricultural, municipal, and
industrial users are “compensated for voluntary reductions in
water use, including the fallowing of agricultural lands or
increased water efficiency.” 290 A total of $3.75 million in
funding has been made available for projects in the Upper
Basin, 291 and the Upper Colorado River Commission currently
administers this part of the program. 292 It selected twentyeight projects for funding in 2015 and 2016—a total
expenditure of $2.5 million aimed at conserving at least 11,300
acre-feet. 293 Truly conceived as a pilot, 294 the Upper Basin
component of the program will extend to September 30, 2017,
at which time there will be a “hard stop” to evaluate its future,
including possibly its long-term administration. 295
To summarize, the structural relationship between the
Compact and Upper Basin Compact places the Upper Division
states in a position of making do with whatever leftovers
remain available for consumptive use after satisfying the
Article III(c) and (d) flow obligations. This dynamic has been a
defining quality of the allocation framework since Meyers
PilotSysConsProg/pilotsystem.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
9BDQ-CTKR] [hereinafter Pilot Program].
289. CRSCP Agreement, supra note 288, at 1.
290. Id. at 6.
291. $2.75 million in initial funding was made available in July 2014. Pilot
Program, supra note 288. An additional $1 million was made available in 2016.
Telephone Conversation with Jane Bird, Legal Counsel, Upper Colo. River
Comm’n (Aug. 17, 2016).
292. See generally UPPER COLO. RIVER COMM’N, AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE
THE SYSTEM CONSERVATION PILOT PROGRAM IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER
BASIN (May 13, 2015) (outlining commission’s administrative obligations) (on file
with author).
293. UCRC 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at 8.
294. See CRSCP Agreement, supra note 288, at 1, 9, 13 (identifying program’s
expiration as either July 30, 2016, or December 31 of the year in which the latest
implementation agreement expires, and calling for subsequent program
evaluation and possible extension or adoption of long-term program).
295. Wolff Interview II, supra note 282; see also UPPER COLO. RIVER COMM’N,
REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS REGARDING A POTENTIAL FUNDING OPPORTUNITY FOR
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN A PILOT SYSTEM WATER CONSERVATION PROGRAM
(Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.ose.state.nm.us/Basins/Colorado/PDF/2017%20SCPP%
20RFP.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9AL-5C4Y] (soliciting project proposals for 2017).
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published The Colorado River fifty years ago. And, despite the
historic drought, the Upper Division states’ gradually
increasing use of the leftovers has yet to precipitate a Compact
call and curtailments. Precisely how Article IV would be
implemented (and interpreted) is unclear as an administrative
matter, though undoubtedly clutch given the provision’s
insulation of pre-1922 rights from curtailment. Continuing
progress nonetheless is being made with curtailment-oriented
intrastate
water
banking
and
temporary
transfer
arrangements, and consumptive use measurements throughout
the Upper Basin. Even more pressing on the priority list is the
Upper Division states’ evolving drought contingency plan, with
its augmentation, reservoir operation, and demand
management components. The plan’s combined goal of avoiding
Compact calls, curtailments, and critical elevations at Lake
Powell has emerged as paramount in contemporary times—
again, a direct outgrowth of the allocation framework’s existing
design. For a structural dynamic posing equal or arguably
greater consternation, one need only set eyes below Lee Ferry.
D.

Arizona v. California Decree

“As Judge Simon Rifkind, the Special Master in Arizona v.
California, once had occasion to remark, the problems of the
river would be solved if only the scientists could turn words
into water.” 296 Meyers shared this quip from his former boss
three years after the Supreme Court’s decision in 1963. 297 Even
more so today, it would be a monumental feat if the Special
Master’s transformation indeed could be worked. Until then,
allocational conditions along the Lower Colorado River
foreseeably will remain as tight as they have ever been. A
disjuncture exists between the amount of water supplied to the
Lower Division states pursuant to the Compact’s flow
obligations, and the amount of water to which these states
have grown accustomed under the Arizona v. California decree.
This disjuncture poses the prospect of recurring shortages in
the Lower Basin. Keen on avoiding constraints on consumptive
use imposed during shortages—as well as maintaining
hydropower production at Hoover Dam—a range of responses

296.
297.

Meyers, supra note 14, at 38.
Id. at 37.
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began emerging in the late 1990s aimed at bolstering Lake
Mead’s storage to avoid shortages and enabling Lower Division
states to mitigate the impacts of shortage-based rationing.
Further, as in the Upper Basin, clarity regarding shortage
administration under the Arizona v. California decree also has
surfaced as a priority during this period. After sketching out
the Lower Colorado River apportionment, this section sheds
light on the dynamic and varied milestones of this constrained
yet pioneering branch of the allocation framework’s evolution.
1. Lower Colorado River Apportionment
The Arizona v. California decree’s apportionment for the
Colorado River mainstream below Lee Ferry is perhaps the
most complex of the four schemes comprising the Law of the
River’s allocation framework. It is rooted in the Supreme
Court’s landmark 1963 decision. 298 Not without dissent and
critical commentary, 299 that decision interpreted the Boulder
Canyon Project Act as having established the scheme through a
statutory apportionment, and concluded the Colorado River
Compact did not play a controlling role vis-à-vis the scheme’s
make-up. 300 To be clear, the apportionment solely accounts for
consumptive use of water from the Lower Colorado River itself,
and is inapplicable to Lower Basin tributaries. 301
The apportionment’s core appears in Article II of the
Court’s decree. It takes a sliding-scale approach when defining
the Lower Division states’ apportionments. Their scope varies
annually based upon a declaration by the Secretary of the
Interior regarding the amount of mainstream water available
for consumptive use. The Secretary may declare three types of
conditions under the decree: normal, surplus, or shortage.
When there is sufficient water to satisfy 7.5 maf of
consumptive use in the Lower Division states, normal
conditions exist and the decree divvies out 2.8 maf to Arizona,
298. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
299. Id. at 603–27 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 627–46 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). For an insightful contemporary perspective on the decision, see
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Arizona v. California: Its Meaning and Significance for
the Colorado River and Beyond After Fifty Years, 4 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 88
(2014).
300. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 564–67.
301. Decree, supra note 156, at art. VIII(B). The decree does govern New
Mexico’s use of the Gila River. Id. at art. IV(A)–(F).
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4.4 maf to California, and 0.3 maf to Nevada. 302 If supplies
allow for more than 7.5 maf of consumptive use, the decree
calls for sharing this surplus on a percentage basis: Arizona,
46%; California, 50%; and Nevada, 4%. 303 Finally, in the event
of shortage conditions wherein less than 7.5 maf of mainstream
water is available for consumptive use, the decree calls for two
measures. First, the Secretary of the Interior must satisfy
“present perfected rights in the order of their priority dates
without regard to state lines.” 304 Second, after consulting with
state representatives and major entitlement holders, the
Secretary has discretion to apportion water remaining
available for consumptive use. 305 The Secretary’s discretion is
confined, however, by two limitations. On one hand, the decree
proscribes more than 4.4 maf being apportioned for use in
California during a shortage, including all present perfected
rights. 306 On the other hand, the Colorado River Basin Project
Act provides California’s basic apportionment of 4.4 maf must
be satisfied in full before any water is supplied to water users
through the Central Arizona Project. 307
Alongside the sliding-scale apportionment provisions is a
paragraph that has played a pivotal role in facilitating
innovation over the past seventeen years: Article II(B)(6). It
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to release water
apportioned to, but unused in, one Lower Division state to a
different Lower Division state on an annual basis. 308 These
reallocations do not alter the states’ apportionments as mapped
out above. Rather, the provision simply allows unused water
within the apportionments to be temporarily utilized in a
Lower Division state (e.g., California) other than the one
holding the apportionment (e.g., Nevada).
Worth echoing on a final note are three features of the
decree’s apportionment that distinguish it from those of the
Upper Basin Compact and Compact. First, the decree’s
“diversions less return flows” method of measuring
“consumptive use” along the Lower Colorado River differs from

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at art. II(B)(1).
Id. at art. II(B)(2).
Id. at art. II(B)(3).
Id.
Id.
Colorado River Basin Project Act § 301(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (2012).
Decree, supra note 156, at art. II(B)(6).
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the Upper Basin Compact’s “inflow-outflow” method by not
accounting for reservoir evaporation—again, the Compact is
silent here. 309 Second, the decree’s cutoff for “present perfected
rights” (June 25, 1929) differs from that of the Upper Basin
Compact (November 24, 1922), with the Compact lacking a
definition. 310 Third, the decree’s treatment of groundwater is
novel. Its apportionment expressly accounts for “water drawn
from the mainstream by underground pumping.” 311 Neither
compact contains an analogue. Although notable in
differentiating the Law of the River’s domestic apportionments,
these distinctions of course should not obscure the constriction
collectively created by the apportionments within the Lower
Basin. It is a tight space, and portends to become even more so,
as revealed below.
2. Structural Deficit & Shortages
Having originated shortly before The Colorado River, the
Arizona v. California decree’s apportionment has since
facilitated a scale of reliance in the Lower Division states as
sobering as the “peopling” figures in Part II. Further, according
to the Basin Study, the dependence of these states on Lower
Colorado River water is projected over the next several decades
to surpass anything ever seen. A few figures are illustrative.
From 1971 to 2010, the Lower Division states’ consumptive use
of mainstream water increased from approximately 6.56 maf in
the former year to 7.40 maf in the latter one, peaking at
roughly 8.41 maf in 2002. 312 Excluded from these figures are
reservoir evaporation ranging from approximately 750,000
acre-feet to 1.3 maf annually, and phreatophyte losses ranging
from slightly above 300,000 acre-feet to slightly above 650,000
acre-feet annually. 313 As of the Bureau of Reclamation’s most
recent water accounting report in 2015, the Lower Division
states’ consumptive use was approximately 7.45 maf, excluding
reservoir evaporation and other losses. 314 Looking forward, the
309. Compare id. at art. I(A), with Upper Basin Compact, supra note 20, at art.
VI.
310. Compare Decree, supra note 156, at art. I(H), with Upper Basin Compact,
supra note 20, at art IV(c).
311. Decree, supra note 156, at art. I(C).
312. TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 35, at C-8 fig.C-3.
313. Id. at C-48 fig.C-19, C-49 fig.C-20.
314. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 5 tbl.1.
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trajectory of demands for Lower Colorado River water projected
in the Basin Study apparently entails a ramp-up of the
historical trend. These demands are expected to range from
slightly above 8.0 maf to slightly below 9.0 maf by 2035, and to
climb somewhere between slightly below 9.0 maf and slightly
above 10.0 maf by 2060, again excluding reservoir evaporation
and other losses. 315 It is ironic that, although the Supreme
Court declined to interpret the Compact in Arizona v.
California, it is nonetheless the Article III(c) and (d) flow
obligations that largely will determine the realism of these
projections and relative security of existing uses.
Just as the Article III(c) and (d) flow obligations constrain
the leftovers available for apportionment among the Upper
Division states under the Upper Basin Compact, so too do these
obligations constrain the flows available for apportionment
among the Lower Division states under the Arizona v.
California decree. One might say “reciprocal constraint” exists.
Its adherence along the Lower Colorado River is paramount in
contemporary times and manifests as the “structural deficit.”
To elaborate briefly, notwithstanding tributary inflows below
Lee Ferry, the Lower Colorado River’s primary source of supply
consists of Lake Powell releases made in fulfillment of the
Article III(c) and (d) flow obligations—again, as currently
implemented by the Interim Guidelines. Prior to the
guidelines, the historical minimum objective release from Lake
Powell had been 8.23 maf per year under the Long-Range
Operating Criteria. 316 Pursuant to the guidelines, this figure
now can be as low as 7.0 maf. 317 The existential problem is that
these volumes fall squarely short of what is needed to enable
the Lower Division states’ to utilize their basic 7.5 maf
apportionment in the Arizona v. California decree for normal
conditions. Thus, as the Director of the Arizona Department of
Water Resources has testified, “a ‘structural deficit’ in the
water supplies available from Lake Mead to California,
Nevada, Arizona, and Mexico exists as an artifact of the ‘Law of
the River.’” 318 “[I]n a normal year a set amount of water flows
315. TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 35, at C-26 fig.C-9.
316. LROC, supra note 205, at art. II(2).
317. INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 57.
318. Testimony of Thomas Buschatzke, Dir., Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., before
U.S. Senate Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res. 2–3 (June 2, 2015),
http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=6fcd8b5d-b4cd-
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into Lake Mead[,] but it is not enough to cover releases for use,
evaporation and delivery losses.” 319 A general rule of thumb for
normal conditions is that “if Lake Powell releases 8.23 maf,
Lake Mead will lose about a million acre[-]feet of storage per
year.” 320 As detailed below in Table 6, figures since the historic
drought’s onset largely bear out this rule. Over the fifteen-year
period from 2000 to 2015, annual Lake Powell releases
averaged 8.70 maf, annual consumptive uses in the Lower
Division states averaged 7.57 maf, and Lake Mead’s elevation
declined an annual average of 839,600 acre-feet (i.e.,
plummeting from 22.444 to 9.85 maf). 321

4956-b0e1-574bfc65ebb5 [https://perma.cc/GSM9-AL9B].
319. Id. at 3.
320. Kuhn, supra note 171, at 34; see also CENT. ARIZ. PROJECT, 2015 YEAR IN
REVIEW
2
(2015),
http://www.cap-az.com/documents/departments/finance/
CAP_2015-YIR-OFA.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFH2-7GQZ] [hereinafter CAP 2015
REVIEW] (describing structural deficit as about 1.2 maf).
321. These figures are drawn from the sources cited infra note 322.
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Table 6. Lake Powell Releases, Lower Basin Mainstream
Consumptive Use, and Lake Mead Storage
Lake Powell Release

Lower Basin Use

Lake Mead Storage

2000

9.40 maf

8.0254 maf

22.444 maf

2001

8.23 maf

8.1704 maf

19.873 maf

2002

8.23 maf

8.4068 maf

17.093 maf

2003

8.23 maf

7.537737 maf

15.618 maf

2004

8.23 maf

7.383836 maf

13.937 maf

2005

8.23 maf

7.064505 maf

15.219 maf

2006

8.23 maf

7.411029 maf

13.89 maf

2007

8.231 maf

7.45433 maf

12.51 maf

2008

8.978 maf

7.520961 maf

12.01 maf

2009

8.23 maf

7.438398 maf

10.933 maf

2010

8.23 maf

7.378643 maf

10.09 maf

2011

12.52 maf

7.316616 maf

12.98 maf

2012

9.47 maf

7.443546 maf

13.14 maf

2013

8.23 maf

7.478219 maf

12.36 maf

2014

7.48 maf

7.649011 maf

10.12 maf

2015

9.00 maf

7.448217 maf

9.85 maf

Sources 322

322. Lake Powell Releases: U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2016, at 18 (2016),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/aop/AOP16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6JW3NUH5] [hereinafter 2016 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2015, at 17 (2015),
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/water/rsvrs/ops/aop/AOP15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BU8NS62] [hereinafter 2015 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2014, at 18 (2014),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/aop/AOP14.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N39-YPBY]
[hereinafter 2014 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL OPERATING
PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2013, at 16–17 (2013),
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/water/rsvrs/ops/aop/AOP13_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
6FWH-HXAM] [hereinafter 2013 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2012, at 18 (2012),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/aop/AOP12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GMR2U8P3] [hereinafter 2012 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2011, at 16 (2011),
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/water/rsvrs/ops/aop/AOP11_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
7HH4-SY4E] [hereinafter 2011 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2010, at 18 (2010),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/AOP2010/AOP10.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UYA-
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WNUT] [hereinafter 2010 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2009, at 17 (2009),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/aop/AOP09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AY2UKJKC] [hereinafter 2009 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2008, at 16 (2008),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/AOP2008/AOP08_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZUL4-PDVK] [hereinafter 2008 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2007, at 16 (2007),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/aop/AOP07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NE75UQKE] [hereinafter 2007 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2006, at 18 (2006),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/AOP2006/aop06_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TEJ4-RU9C] [hereinafter 2006 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL
OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2005, at 15 (2005),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/aop/AOP05.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LT8-8XJY]
[hereinafter 2005 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL OPERATING
PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 2004, at 15 (2004), http://www.usbr.gov/
lc/region/g4000/aop/AOP04.pdf [https://perma.cc/43JA-SZMR] [hereinafter 2004
AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO
RIVER RESERVOIRS 2003, at 14 (2003), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/aop/
AOP03.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX49-LHAP] [hereinafter 2003 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS
2002,
at
11
(2002),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/aop/AOP02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6PN-449S] [hereinafter 2002 AOP]; U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, ANNUAL OPERATING PLAN FOR COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS
2001,
at
11
(2001),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/aop/AOP01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PQP9-ME73] [hereinafter 2001 AOP]. Lower Basin Management
Consumptive Use: 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 5 tbl.1; 2014
ACCOUNTING, supra note 150, at 5 tbl.1; 2013 ACCOUNTING, supra note 150, at 2;
2012 ACCOUNTING, supra note 150, at 2; 2011 ACCOUNTING, supra note 150, at 2;
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE
REPORT ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 2 (2010), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2010/2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KPQ4-87GL]
[hereinafter 2010 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO
RIVER ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE REPORT ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA
2 (2009), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2009/2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W93U-6UH2] [hereinafter 2009 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE REPORT ARIZONA,
CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 2 (2008), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/
4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2008/2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK99-8KRM] [hereinafter
2008 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER
ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE REPORT ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 2
(2007),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2007/2007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H228-GR86] [hereinafter 2007 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE REPORT ARIZONA,
CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 2 (2006), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/
4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2006/2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8PV-FPNF] [hereinafter
2006 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER
ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE REPORT ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 2
(2005),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2005/2005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AE4A-PTLQ] [hereinafter 2005 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER ACCOUNTING AND WATER USE REPORT ARIZONA,
CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 2 (2004), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/
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The structural deficit poses the prospect of recurring
shortages along the Lower Colorado River under the Arizona v.
California decree. If future Lake Powell releases average 8.23
maf (or less) per year, then on a consistent basis less than 7.5
maf will be available for consumptive use by the Lower
Division states. Although a shortage has not been declared in
the half-century since the decree’s issuance, the Secretary of
the Interior released only 7.48 maf from Lake Powell in 2014—
an unprecedented drop below the historical 8.23 maf minimum
objective release since the reservoir’s filling in the 1980s. 323
Further, as noted earlier, recent Bureau of Reclamation
projections identify upwards of a sixty-percent shortage
probability over the next several years. 324 In the big picture,
“[i]t’s really not a question of if, but when,” 325 a shortage
declaration will be made, given the combined or perhaps even

4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2004/2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD9L-AQDP] [hereinafter
2004 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ACCOUNTING FOR COLORADO
RIVER WATER USE WITHIN THE STATES OF ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 2
(2003),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2003/2003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72CG-M57N] [hereinafter 2003 ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, COMPILATION OF RECORDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF
THE DECREE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN ARIZONA V.
CALIFORNIA ET AL. 1 (2002), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/
DecreeRpt/2002DecreeRpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UEU-J23W] [hereinafter 2002
ACCOUNTING]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COMPILATION OF RECORDS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE DECREE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES IN ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA ET AL. DATED MARCH 9, 1964 1 (2001),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2001DecreeRpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VH7F-3WVE]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COMPILATION OF
RECORDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE DECREE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA DATED MARCH 9, 1964 1
(2000), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2000Decree
Rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3W9-U9JZ]. Lake Mead Storage: 2016 AOP, supra, at 8
tbl.1; 2015 AOP, supra, at 20; 2014 AOP, supra, at 20; 2013 AOP, supra, at 21;
2012 AOP, supra, at 21; 2011 AOP, supra, at 22; 2010 AOP, supra, at 9 tbl.1; 2009
AOP, supra, at 21; 2008 AOP, supra, at 20; 2007 AOP, supra, at 20; 2006 AOP,
supra, at 22; 2005 AOP, supra, at 5 tbl.1(a); 2004 AOP, supra, at 7 tbl.1(a); 2003
AOP, supra, at 6 tbl.1(a); 2002 AOP, supra, at 4 tbl.1(a); 2001 AOP, supra, at 4
tbl.1(b).
323. CENT. ARIZ. PROJECT, COLORADO RIVER WATER SUPPLY AND 24-MONTH
STUDY 1 (2013), http://www.cap-az.com/documents/public-information/24-monthstudy-FactSheet_ColRiver.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BEB-842K].
324. SHORTAGE PROJECTIONS, supra note 141, at 6.
325. Aaron Orlowski, Orange County Faces More Competition for DroughtStrangled Colorado River, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, March 5, 2016,
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/water-707026-river-colorado.html
[https://perma.cc/TV3X-4FPA] (quoting MWD Colorado River Manager Bill
Hasencamp).
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singular effect of projected climate change-based reductions in
Lee Ferry flows, and projected increased consumptive use in
the Upper Division states. 326 Policymakers have been aware of
this shortage risk and structural deficit since at least the
Pacific Southwest Water Plan in 1964. 327 Coupled with
concerns about maintaining Lake Mead’s storage above critical
elevations, and thereby preserving Hoover Dam’s hydropower
capacity and revenues, these challenges have spurred a host of
developments over the past two decades involving shortage
administration and avoidance.
a. Administration: Shortage “Sharing”
In which specific circumstances will the Secretary of the
Interior declare a shortage under the Arizona v. California
decree? Further, how exactly will this declaration affect each
Lower Division state? The need for clarity and certainty
embedded in these questions loomed large during the Interim
Guidelines’ formation. 328 Forged in 2007, the guidelines
responded to this priority with a tiered approach resembling
the coordinated operating regime for Lake Powell and Lake
Mead as well as Minute 319’s shortage-sharing scheme.
The fact that the Interim Guidelines’ shortage-sharing
rules for Lake Mead track their Minute 319 successors makes
sense given vocal concerns expressed during the guidelines’
formation about Mexico’s sharing shortages with the Lower
Division states—or at least two of them as of now. 329 The
guidelines’ shortage tiers revolve around Lake Mead’s projected
elevation on January 1 each year. If this elevation falls
between 1,075 and 1,050 feet, 7.167 maf will be apportioned to
the Lower Division states, and Arizona’s and Nevada’s
respective apportionments will be limited to 2.48 maf and
287,000 acre-feet. 330 At the next rung, if Lake Mead’s elevation
is projected to range from 1,050 and 1,025 feet, the total
apportionment will be reduced to 7.083 maf, with Arizona’s and
326. See TECHNICAL REPORT B, supra note 8, at B-66 (Lee Ferry flow
decreases); TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 35, at C-27 fig.C-9 (consumptive use
increases); Grant, supra note 212, at 982 (describing how factors suggest
shortages will be “constant concern,” not limited to droughts, in future).
327. WATER PLAN, supra note 84, at 10.
328. INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 6.
329. See id. at 54 (reflecting emphasis on Mexico’s sharing shortages).
330. Id. at 37.
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Nevada’s shares cut to 2.4 maf and 283,000 acre-feet,
respectively. 331 Finally, in the event Lake Mead’s projected
elevation lies below 1,025 feet, 7.0 maf will be apportioned, and
Arizona’s and Nevada’s respective apportionments will be
reduced to 2.32 maf and 280,000 acre-feet. 332 Annual
consultation is required at the bottom tier, and if Lake Mead’s
elevation seems likely to fall below 1,000 feet, further
consultation will address instating “additional measures
consistent with applicable federal law.” 333
The current iteration of the Interim Guidelines’ framework
is just that: an iteration. At the time of this writing, the Lower
Division states and Bureau of Reclamation are discussing
possibly tweaking the framework as part of ongoing drought
contingency planning. One key feature of the potential
modifications is that California would share shortages—rather
than having its 4.4 maf apportionment for normal conditions
fully insulated—and accept curtailments of 200,000 to 350,000
acre-feet at various tiers if Lake Mead’s projected January 1
elevation were 1,045 feet or below. 334 Further, Arizona and
Nevada would absorb curtailments at a new 1,090-feet tier, and
Arizona likewise would shoulder higher-volume curtailments,
including a 720,000 acre-feet hit if Lake Mead’s projected
elevation were 1,025 feet or below. 335 This revised scheme will
take effect by 2018 if ultimately forged. 336
b. Avoidance: Water Banking, ICS/DSS & Pilot
Programs
Shifting from the Interim Guidelines’ shortage
administration approach, a handful of programs have arisen
along the Lower Colorado River over the past two decades
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 55.
334. Amy McCoy, Dir., Aylward + McCoy & Pilz Consulting LLC, Presentation
at the University of Colorado Law School 2016 Martz Summer Conference:
Arizona’s Contributions to Address Lake Mead’s Structural Deficit 6 (June 9,
2016), http://www.colorado.edu/law/sites/default/files/Amy%20McCoy%20Martz%
20Conference.pptx [https://perma.cc/93QR-ADT9].
335. Id.
336. Tony Davis, Tribes, Farms Wary of Proposed Cuts in Water Deliveries from
Lake Mead, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 28, 2016, http://lasvegassun.com/news/
2016/jul/28/tribes-farms-wary-of-proposed-cuts-in-water-delive/ [https://perma.cc/
5KVW-Y82S].
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aimed at intertwined avoidance goals—namely, avoiding a
shortage declaration under the Arizona v. California decree,
preventing Lake Mead’s elevation from reaching critical levels,
and mitigating impacts of a shortage declaration if one were
made. Harmony exists among these programs to a large extent,
but as will become clear some dissonance appears inherent
between the first program to originate, an interstate water
banking program, and its successors.
The Lower Basin water banking program’s roots trace to
federal regulations promulgated in 1999. 337 As alluded to
above, Article II(B)(6) of the Arizona v. California decree is the
program’s linchpin, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to
release water apportioned to, but unused in, one Lower
Division state to a different Lower Division state. 338 At the core
of the program are “storage and interstate release agreements”
(SIRAs) formed by “storing entities” and “consuming
entities.” 339 The interactions between these parties and the
Secretary generally proceed as follows. 340 Initially, a storing
entity stores water from the Colorado River mainstream in an
off-stream reservoir or groundwater aquifer in a Lower
Division state. Based on this activity, the storing entity
develops “intentionally created unused apportionment”
(ICUA). 341 In turn, at a later time, the storing entity requests
the Secretary to release the ICUA to a consuming entity in a
different Lower Division state for its use. The Lower Division
states’
apportionments
remain
intact
under
this
arrangement. 342 The Secretary accounts for water stored by a
storing entity as a consumptive use during the year of
storage, 343 and accounts for consumptive use of ICUA by a
consuming entity as a consumptive use during the year the
water is released. 344
Two SIRAs have been formed under the Lower Basin
337. 43 C.F.R. §§ 414.1–414.6 (2016).
338. Decree, supra note 156, at art. II(B)(6).
339. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 414.2, 414.3(a)(1)–(18) (2016) (defining “storing entity”
and “consuming entity,” and detailing SIRA features). Participation generally
requires a secretarial contract under section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
Id. § 414.3(e).
340. See id. § 414.1(a)(1)–(4) (illuminating interactions).
341. Id. § 414.2.
342. Id. § 414.1(b)(4).
343. Id. § 414.4(b)(1).
344. Id. § 414.4(b)(2).
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water banking program thus far. 345 The first agreement arose
in 2002 and involves the Arizona Water Banking Authority
(AWBA) storing water from Arizona’s or Nevada’s decree
apportionments for the SNWA’s benefit. 346 Formed two years
later, in 2004, the second agreement similarly calls for the
MWD storing water from Nevada’s decree apportionment for
the SNWA. 347 As of the Bureau of Reclamation’s most recent
water accounting report in 2015, the AWBA and MWD have
banked a total of 931,266 acre-feet for the SNWA under these
agreements. 348 The AWBA has banked 601,041 acre-feet,349
storing 527,520 acre-feet prior to the Interim Guidelines’
Intentionally Created Surplus (ICS) program coming online in
2008, and 73,521 acre-feet thereafter. 350 As for the remaining
330,225 acre-feet, the pattern is inverted: the MWD banked
only 25,000 acre-feet of this water before the guidelines’ ICS
program commenced, and 305,225 acre-feet since then. 351
Notably, beyond its interstate activities, the AWBA has
engaged in intrastate banking of more than 3.4 maf since its
formation in 1996. 352 While these resources are golden given
Arizona’s and Nevada’s positions under the Interim Guidelines’
shortage-sharing rules described above, the roughly 4.3 maf
stored through this interstate and intrastate banking is plainly
not banked in Lake Mead. 353 It does not stave off shortages and
critical elevations.
Following on the interstate water banking program’s heels,
345. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 33.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 34 tbl.12.
349. Id.
350. Id.; 2014 ACCOUNTING, supra note 150, at 34; 2013 ACCOUNTING, supra
note 150, at 28; 2012 ACCOUNTING, supra note 150, at 27; 2011 ACCOUNTING,
supra note 150, at 27; 2010 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at 27; 2009
ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at 27; 2008 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at 27;
2007 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at 29; 2006 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at
29; 2005 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at 30; 2004 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322,
at 30; 2003 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at 32; 2002 ACCOUNTING, supra note
322, at 36.
351. See sources cited supra note 350. The MWD participated in an ICS
demonstration program in 2006 and 2007. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at
48.
352. ARIZ. WATER BANKING AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 1, 11 tbl.4 (2016),
http://www.azwaterbank.gov/Plans_and_Reports_Documents/documents/2015Ann
ualReportwithletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JWC-N8E2] [hereinafter AWBA 2015
REPORT].
353. Id. at 11 tbl.4 (identifying 4,049,657 acre-feet of banked water).
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the Interim Guidelines brought into effect in 2008 the ICS
program noted above and a Developed Shortage Supply (DSS)
program. 354 Both programs entail storing water in Lake Mead
rather than elsewhere.
The ICS program resembles Minute 319’s ICMA program
outlined earlier, generally allowing parties entitled to use
Lower Colorado River water (“contractors”) 355 to bank portions
of their entitlements in Lake Mead stemming from
conservation and augmentation activities. Examples include
land fallowing, canal lining, desalination programs, tributary
water right purchases, capital contributions to water
conservation programs, and importation of non-Colorado River
System water. 356 Subject to annual and cumulative limits,
contractors create and store ICS in Lake Mead through these
activities, relying on the conserved or augmented water in lieu
of mainstream deliveries. 357 At a later date, contractors can
request delivery of the ICS, provided the Secretary of the
Interior is authorized to release it under conditions specified by
the guidelines. 358 These conditions include that “[t]he Secretary
has determined an ICS Surplus Condition,” evidencing ICS
cannot be retrieved during shortages. 359
Although smaller in scope, the DSS program mirrors the
ICS program, with contractors authorized to create DSS by
purchasing tributary water rights or importing non-Colorado
River System water. 360 Relying on this tributary or imported
water—and banking the mainstream water afforded by their
entitlements in Lake Mead—contractors can later request the
Secretary of the Interior to release their unused mainstream
water (DSS) during a shortage. 361 More specifically, DSS can
be created only in a shortage, DSS must be used in its year of
creation, and DSS deliveries cannot cause deliveries to the

354. See Grant, supra note 212, at 975–79 (describing ICS and DSS programs).
355. See INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 30 (defining
“contractor”).
356. These activities fall into four ICS categories: Extraordinary Conservation
ICS, Tributary Conservation ICS, System Efficiency ICS, and Imported ICS. Id. at
38–39.
357. See id. at 40–42 (prescribing ICS creation rules).
358. See id. at 42–43 (prescribing ICS delivery rules).
359. Id. at 42; see also id. at 36 (outlining “Interim Surplus Condition”
characteristics).
360. Id. at 44.
361. Id. at 45.
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Lower Division states to reach or exceed 7.5 maf. 362
As with the Lower Basin water banking program, the ICS
and DSS programs do not alter the Lower Division states’
apportionments under the Arizona v. California decree. To
ensure conformity with the apportionments, contractors have
formed forbearance agreements whereby they have agreed to
refrain from using ICS and DSS to which they (and their
respective states) otherwise would be entitled. 363 These
agreements render the water unused and therefore eligible for
reallocation by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to Article
II(B)(6).
While nothing has taken place yet under the DSS program,
the ICS program has seen a fair amount of activity over the
past decade, including both creation of ICS in, and deliveries of
ICS from, Lake Mead. In total, four entities have participated:
the CAWCD, Imperial Irrigation District (IID), MWD, and
SNWA. 364 The SNWA has been most active. It banked ICS
annually from 2008 to 2015, 365 maintaining a 511,023 acre-feet
account balance as of 2015. 366 The MWD likewise has utilized
the ICS program, as well as a predecessor ICS demonstration
program in 2006 and 2007, to a reasonable extent. The MWD
banked ICS consistently across this period, 367 yet held an
account balance of only 80,405 acre-feet as of 2015, 368 due to
ICS deliveries in 2008, 2013, 2014, and 2015 totaling 532,581
acre-feet. 369 Neither the CAWCD nor the IID has been engaged
at significant levels. They maintained account balances of
103,050 and 17,386 acre-feet, respectively, as of 2015, 370 with

Id. at 45–46.
See generally U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, LOWER COLORADO RIVER
BASIN INTENTIONALLY CREATED SURPLUS FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT (2007),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/agreements/Forbearance.PDF
[https://perma.cc/ECW6-FWEH].
364. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 49 tbl.23; 2014 ACCOUNTING, supra
note 150, at 49 tbl.23; 2013 ACCOUNTING, supra note 150, at 45; 2012
ACCOUNTING, supra note 150, at 44; 2011 ACCOUNTING, supra note 150, at 44;
2010 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at 44; 2009 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at
45; 2008 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at 45.
365. See sources cited supra note 364.
366. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 49 tbl.23.
367. See sources cited supra note 364; see also 2007 ACCOUNTING, supra note
322, at 49; 2006 ACCOUNTING, supra note 322, at 48.
368. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 49 tbl.23.
369. See sources cited supra note 364.
370. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 49 tbl.23.
362.
363.
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literally or virtually no ICS deliveries having occurred. 371
Overall, between 2006 and 2015, these four parties banked
1,461,490 acre-feet of ICS and requested 623,410 acre-feet of
ICS deliveries, 372 translating to a collective net account balance
of 711,864 acre-feet in Lake Mead at the period’s end. 373
Moving forward from the Lower Basin water banking and
ICS and DSS programs, the final strand of Lower Colorado
River shortage avoidance developments consists of two pilot
programs that arose in 2014 as part of Lower Basin drought
contingency planning.
The first program also involves the Upper Division states
and already has been broached: the “Pilot System Conservation
Program.” 374 Begun in July 2014, this program aims to avoid
shortage declarations and critical elevations at Lake Mead by
utilizing pooled funding to compensate agricultural, industrial,
and municipal water users for voluntary reductions—e.g.,
agricultural
land
fallowing
or
water
efficiency
improvements. 375 A total of $13.75 million has been made
available for projects in the Lower Division states, 376 and the
Bureau of Reclamation’s Lower Colorado Region is the
administrative entity. 377 Six projects have been approved by
the Bureau to date, and they are collectively expected to
conserve roughly 63,000 acre-feet of water in Lake Mead at an
average of $136 per acre-foot being paid to participants.378
Stemming from a solicitation issued in March 2016, 379 the

371. See sources cited supra note 364.
372. Id.
373. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 49 tbl.23. These creation and
delivery totals reveal how ICS deductions also account for evaporation losses,
inadvertent overrun paybacks, and system assessments.
374. See generally CRSCP Agreement, supra note 288.
375. Id. at 6, 9, 14.
376. $8.25 million in initial funding was provided in July 2014, and $3.5
million in additional federal funding was made available in 2016. Pilot Program,
supra note 288. The MWD and CAWCD also contributed $2 million in additional
funding in 2016. Telephone Interview with John Shields, Agric. Eng’r, U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, Lower Colo. Reg’l Office, former Interstate Streams Eng’r,
Wyo. State Eng’r’s Office (1984–2014) (Aug. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Shields
Interview II].
377. Pilot Program, supra note 288.
378. Id.
379. See generally Letter from Terrance J. Fulp, Reg’l Dir., Lower Colo. Region,
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, to Interested Parties (March 25, 2016),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/PilotSysConsProg/SecondSolicitationLette
r-25March2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ET7-CYTY].
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Bureau is currently signing implementation agreements for a
new phase of projects. 380 Although an evaluation of the
program is called for upon its conclusion—to determine
whether to extend it or to adopt a long-term program—the
precise timing of the program’s close and evaluation remain to
be seen. 381
Of just slightly more recent vintage in the Lower Basin is a
second program of “Pilot Drought Response Actions” that arose
in December 2014. 382 Driven again by concerns about shortages
and critical elevations, this program focuses on creating
“protection volumes” in Lake Mead. 383 Its overarching goal is
the creation of 1.5 to 3.0 maf of protection volume between
2014 and 2019. 384 Program participants have committed to
making “best efforts” to create a total of 740,000 acre-feet of
protection volume in the following shares by 2018: CAWCD,
345,000 acre-feet; MWD, 300,000 acre-feet; Bureau of
Reclamation, 50,000 acre-feet; and SNWA, 45,000 acre-feet.385
The SNWA’s measures for attaining its goal notably include
“reductions in off-stream storage of Colorado River water.”386
Other parties intend to generate protection volumes by
creating or deferring delivery of ICS. 387 Water stored in Lake
Mead under the Pilot System Conservation Program likewise
can be leveraged for this purpose to an extent. 388 Ultimately,
380. Id.; Shields Interview II, supra note 376.
381. See CRSCP Agreement, supra note 288, at 1, 9, 13 (identifying program’s
expiration as either July 30, 2016, or December 31 of the year in which the latest
implementation agreement expires, and calling for program evaluation and
potential subsequent actions after this point).
382. See generally MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE U.S.,
THROUGH THE DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE CENT.
ARIZ. WATER CONSERVATION DIST., THE METRO. WATER DIST. OF S. CAL., THE S.
NEV. WATER AUTH., THE ARIZ. DEP’T OF WATER RES., THE COLO. RIVER BD. OF
CAL., AND THE COLO. RIVER COMM’N OF NEV. FOR PILOT DROUGHT RESPONSE
ACTIONS (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.hcn.org/external_files/editorial/PilotDrought
[https://perma.cc/L64S-QT9M] [hereinafter PDRA Memo].
383. Id. at 5–7.
384. Id. at 5.
385. Id. at 6–7.
386. Id. at 5–6.
387. Id. at 6.
388. See id. at 7 (providing for future agreement whereby protection volumes
could be created by water conserved through expansion of program); Western
Water Supply and Planning Enhancement Act, S. 2902, 114th Cong. § 104 (2016);
Pending Legislation: Hearing on S. 2524, S. 2533, S. 2616, S. 2902 & S. 2907
Before the Subcomm. on Water & Power of the S. Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res.,
114th Cong. 10 (2016) (statement of Thomas Buschatzke, Dir., Ariz. Dept. of
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the memorandum underlying the program will expire on
December 31, 2019. 389
One final aspect of the pilot programs deserves mention
before concluding this account of institutional evolution along
the Lower Colorado River. In July 2016, the Department of the
Interior committed to not releasing water stored in Lake Mead
by one Lower Division state through these programs to another
Lower Division state absent a three-state consensus. 390 This
commitment spanned until the end of 2016. 391 It emerged in
lieu of legislation introduced two months earlier by Arizona
Senator Jeff Flake aimed at the same goal—albeit on a longterm basis—underpinned by calls from Arizona for “absolute
certainty” that system water conserved through the programs
would remain in Lake Mead. 392 Arizona officials described the
commitment as “precedential” and expressed hopes that the
new administration will “follow suit.” 393
By way of summary, the Lower Division states have grown
increasingly dependent on flows supplied to the Lower
Colorado River as Lake Powell releases over the half-century
since The Colorado River—a pattern projected by the Basin
Study to heighten to unprecedented levels. Whether these
projections play out, and whether existing users of Lower
Colorado River enjoy firm or marginal security, has everything
to do with the Compact’s Article III(c) and (d) flow obligations.
While the Arizona v. California decree apportions Lower
Colorado River water, the Compact flow obligations and
corresponding Lake Powell releases provide the primary supply
based upon which the Secretary makes annual declarations
regarding existent conditions. Stemming from this interface, a
structural dynamic arguably more disconcerting than the
Water Res.) (stating “both Intentionally Created Surplus and system conservation
water are accounted” for by 740,000 acre-feet protection volume goal) [hereinafter
Buschatzke Testimony].
389. PDRA Memo, supra note 382, at 10.
390. Letter from Michael L. Connor, Dep. Sec’y of the Interior, to Hon. Jeff
Flake, U.S. Senator for Ariz. 2 (July 19, 2016), http://www.flake.senate.gov/
public/_cache/files/0905de45-eaf4-4035-8a0f-4afa21b3ec11/connor-flake-coriver.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2EJ-AQXK].
391. Id.
392. Buschatzke Testimony, supra note 388, at 10–11.
393. Interior Department, Sen. Jeff Flake, Agree to Assuring Arizona Water
Remains
Arizona’s
Water,
ARIZ.
DEP’T
OF
WATER
RESOURCES,
http://www.azwater.gov/azdwr/ADWR_News/JeffFlakeArizonaWater.htm
(last
visited Aug. 15, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZHP8-LN6H].
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Upper Division states’ “leftovers” is the disconnect between (1)
the 8.23 maf historical minimum objective Lake Powell release
in the Long-Range Operating Criteria, and lower Lake Powell
releases permitted by the Interim Guidelines (e.g., 7.0 maf),
versus (2) the 7.5 maf apportioned for normal conditions in the
Arizona v. California decree. These ends do not meet. And
although a wave of shortage administration and avoidance
innovations have emerged over the past two decades, it is
respectfully unclear whether these efforts and their successors
will suffice to close the gap. For although the structural deficit
traces at least as far back as the roughly contemporaneous
debuts of the Arizona v. California decree and Meyers’s
scholarship, it has become in modern times an imminent
matter portending routine Lower Colorado River shortages.
IV. SYNTHESIS, PROGNOSIS & PRESCRIPTION: ADAPTIVE
FRAMING
In the fifty-year period since The Colorado River’s
publication, the Law of the River’s international and interstate
allocation framework has entered uncharted waters,
particularly over the past two decades with the historic
drought. Sweeping broadly across this half-century, the
framework’s constituent apportionments illuminated by
Meyers have transitioned from a “Big Buildup” constituted by
the plumbing, peopling, and point tipping patterns surveyed in
Part II to an “Era of Limits” exemplified by the unprecedented
water supply and demand imbalance facing the basin. 394 On
the supply side, one might say a “reset” has occurred with the
historic drought and climate change projections, 395 and a
similar perspective applies to the landmark of demands
exceeding supplies on average across the past decade. 396
“Adaptive framing” captures, as an overarching concept,
the iterative and interim nature of the diverse measures
examined in Part III that have emerged thus far to adapt the
allocation framework to the Era of Limits. As referenced
earlier, this concept accounts for three broad types of adaptive
patterns that can be discerned when analyzing from a
394. See supra notes 29 and 30 and accompanying text.
395. Telephone interview with Dr. Terry Fulp, Regional Dir., U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, Lower Colo. Region (Jan. 9, 2016) [hereinafter Fulp Interview].
396. STUDY REPORT, supra note 6, at SR-7 fig.2.
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comparative perspective the numerous (and, in some cases,
parallel) innovations to the framework’s constituent
apportionments. These patterns are part and parcel of adaptive
framing. Retrospectively, the patterns synthesize the slew of
evolutionary material and characterize the allocation
framework’s contemporary form. Prospectively, the patterns
provide insights into how the allocation framework foreseeably
will, and arguably should, evolve in coming decades. The
discussion below fleshes out the adaptive patterns in full. It
begins by addressing the utilization of reservoir operating
regimes for water-use rationing and risk allocation, then turns
to the “surrogate” role played by these regimes as management
tools for interpretive conflicts, and concludes by focusing on the
varied measures developed in recent years for avoiding or
mitigating constraints on consumptive use imposed by the
apportionments. Each section assumes a standardized form,
initially synthesizing evolutionary material in Part III
evidencing the particular pattern, and then considering from
positive and normative angles that pattern’s persistence.
A.

Of Boundaries: Rationing & Risk Allocation
1. Operational Apportionment Implementation

A threshold adaptive pattern evident in the allocation
framework’s evolution since Meyers’s scholarship concerns the
widening scope of institutional preparations for implementing
the framework’s apportionments during water shortages and
low-reservoir conditions. Adaptation of most, yet not all, of the
apportionments
has
involved
multi-party,
negotiated
formulation of reservoir operating regimes aimed at outlining
precisely how the apportionments will be implemented in
response to diminished flows and reservoir levels. From a
planning and risk management perspective, these regimes
provide water users with clarity and certainty, and
simultaneously conserve reservoir storage through elevation
tier-based rationing, albeit with a shared understanding of the
regimes’ impermanent nature.
All of the reservoir operating regimes serving this
apportionment-implementation function have arisen during the
historic drought and are slated to continue in their current or
successive forms for an interim period upwards of roughly ten
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years. Specifically, the Interim Guidelines established the
coordinated operating regime for Lake Powell and Lake Mead,
as well as Lake Mead’s individual operating regime, in 2007. At
bottom, the former implements the Compact’s Article III(c) and
(d) flow obligations, while the latter implements Article II(B)(3)
of the Arizona v. California decree. Five years later, in 2012,
Minute 319 incorporated the latter regime’s elevation tiers
when crafting shortage-sharing rules for the U.S.-Mexico
Treaty. Looking ahead, Minute 319’s regime will expire on
December 31, 2017, with a potential comprehensive Minute
extending it in some form through December 31, 2026. 397
Additionally, the Interim Guidelines regimes will be subject to
formal review beginning no later than December 31, 2020, and
are set to expire on December 31, 2025. 398
2.Toward Further Clarity, Comity & Equity
The genesis of these reservoir operating regimes was not a
flash in the pan, but rather a milestone that foreseeably will
and should guide the allocation framework’s ongoing
adaptation. Promotion of clarity, certainty, and conservation
are laudable goals. Consider again the Basin Study’s arguably
conservative projections regarding climate change-based
reductions in Lee Ferry flows (e.g., mean projection of an 8.7%
decrease in historical levels by 2060), 399 coupled with its
counterparts suggesting increased consumptive use in both the
Upper Basin (e.g., 5.5 maf by 2060 excluding reservoir
evaporation) 400 and the Lower Basin (e.g., 9.0 maf by 2060
excluding reservoir evaporation). 401 The accuracy of these
projections remains to be seen, but their convergence suggests,
if anything, an even higher premium should be placed in the
future on continuing to use clearly delineated, conservationoriented operating regimes to implement the apportionments.
Three specific points are worth considering along these lines.
An initial point concerns the absence of curtailment
guidelines for Article IV of the Upper Basin Compact. While
such guidelines cannot be equated literally with the Interim
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

MINUTE 319, supra note 136, at 3.
INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 56–57.
TECHNICAL REPORT B, supra note 8, at B-66.
TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 35, at C-25 fig.C-9.
Id.
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Guidelines’ and Minute 319’s reservoir operating regimes,
these measures do share a common function of mapping out
how the respective apportionments will be implemented in
response to precarious flow levels and reservoir storage. From
this angle, the lack of clarity and certainty regarding Article
IV’s administration distinguishes the Upper Basin Compact’s
apportionment from its counterparts. This observation is in no
way intended to disregard Upper Division state policymakers’
confidence in the Interim Guidelines and Basin States’
Agreement preventing a Compact call and curtailments prior to
2026. Nonetheless, it seems sensible to clarify Article IV’s
nuances proactively in just such a “safe harbor,” rather than to
kick the proverbial can down the road for others to tackle these
challenges reactively with marginal breathing room. Further,
the work begun by the Upper Colorado River Commission’s
Engineering Advisory Committee several years ago to develop
Article IV guidelines suggests a reinvigoration of this effort
would be less taxing than if pursued from scratch. 402
A related point involves California’s current insulation
from shortage sharing under the Interim Guidelines’ operating
regime for Lake Mead. As suggested by the Lower Basin
drought contingency planning effort, this insulation needs to be
reassessed. It arguably runs contrary to foundational Law of
the River principles like equity and comity (i.e., providing for
equitable apportionment of Colorado River System water, and
promoting comity in sovereign relations over this water). 403 As
outlined earlier, Arizona’s and Nevada’s apportionments in the
Arizona v. California decree stand to diminish from 2.8 to 2.32
maf and 300,000 to 280,000 acre-feet, respectively, under the
Interim Guidelines’ regime. 404 These reductions equate to
approximately 17.1% and 6.7% of the apportionments. Minute
319’s parallel regime similarly contemplates treaty deliveries
to a nation-state falling from 1.5 to 1.25 maf annually—a
roughly 16.7% diminution. 405 California does not shoulder the
shortage burden at all. Reductions ranging from 294,800 to
752,400 acre-feet would be in order if its 4.4 maf apportionment
were subject to the 6.7% and 17.1% reductions respectively
402. See SEO PLAN, supra note 258, at 5 (noting guideline drafting efforts).
403. See Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. I (articulating equity and
comity principles).
404. INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 37.
405. MINUTE 319, supra note 136, at 6.
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borne by Nevada and Arizona. At the end of the day,
notwithstanding its post-Arizona v. California statutory
priority vis-à-vis Central Arizona Project water users, 406 this
approach to shortage “sharing” warrants rethinking. Two
commonsensical but critical aspects of it deserve attention
relevant to the equity and comity principles: (1) scaling—
establishment (and perhaps standardization) of the precise
elevation tiers at which the respective Lower Division states
and Mexico will be subject to shortage reductions, and (2)
rationing—prescription of the relative amounts of shortage
reductions at the particular tiers. These considerations
warrant sustained, fair-minded attention both in the ongoing
drought contingency planning process and the Interim
Guidelines’ formal review.
Last but not least is a broad, heavy point regarding
implementation of the Compact’s apportionment—specifically,
its Article III(c) and (d) flow obligations—through the Interim
Guidelines’ coordinated operating regime for Lake Powell and
Lake Mead. 407 Simply put, no guidelines’ component requires
higher prioritization and scrutiny during the upcoming formal
review. Implemented by this regime, the Article III(c) and (d)
flow obligations in no uncertain terms control the respective
amounts of water available for apportionment under the Upper
Basin Compact and Arizona v. California decree. Again, there
is “reciprocal constraint” and concomitantly an existential
assignment of risk. This dynamic is inherent to the allocation
framework’s existing design, and it is critical to recognize when
evaluating how rationing and risk allocation should be handled
under a successive regime for coordinating the reservoirs’
operations and thus implementing the Law of the River’s
“constitution.” 408 Capitalizing on operational experience from
the Interim Guidelines, the regime’s elevation tiers and Lake
Powell release schedules must comport with the Compact’s
equity and comity principles. 409 It should foster basinwide
cooperation and sharing, including mutual sacrifice.

406. Colorado River Basin Project Act § 301(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (2012).
407. INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 56.
408. See Adler, supra note 154, at 21 (analogizing Compact to constitution).
409. Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. I (articulating equity and comity
principles).
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Of Surrogacy: Interpretive Conflict Management
1. Surrogacy

There is an intertwined adaptive pattern apparent in the
allocation framework’s evolution since The Colorado River that
has involved the reservoir operating regimes just discussed in a
distinct yet related way. Enmeshed with their apportionmentimplementation functions, these regimes also have served as
interpretive
conflict
management
mechanisms—more
precisely, as mechanisms for managing actual or potential
conflicts surrounding contrary interpretations of the
apportionments’ framing provisions. The regimes may be
conceived of as “surrogates” for traditional approaches to such
conflicts like litigation. 410
Two key instances of this pattern are apparent. First, the
Interim Guidelines emerged in 2007 as an instrument for
handling entrenched disagreements over the Upper Division
states’ obligation to contribute treaty flows under Article III(c)
of the Compact. 411 Up to December 31, 2025, the guidelines’
coordinated operating regime for Lake Powell and Lake
Mead—coupled with the Basin States’ Agreement and its
mandatory consultation requirement—will provide the
mechanism for addressing these multifaceted disputes. 412
Second, originating five years after the Interim Guidelines,
Minute 319’s shortage-sharing rules for treaty deliveries fill a
vacuum emanating from the arguably inadministrable text of
Article 10(b) of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty. 413 Article 10(b) remains
unabridged. But Minute 319 accomplishes up to December 31,
2017, what may have been practically impossible if it would
have been necessary to give expression to “extraordinary
drought” and adjacent perplexing terms. 414 This author
anticipates a comprehensive Minute indeed will fulfill this role

410. Fulp Interview, supra note 395.
411. See supra section III.B.3.
412. INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 57; Basin States’
Agreement, supra note 158, at 13. As noted earlier, the Basin States’ Agreement’s
mandatory consultation provision states it will survive for five years beyond the
agreement’s expiration or termination. Basin States’ Agreement, supra, note 158,
at 10.
413. See supra section III.A.3.
414. MINUTE 319, supra note 136, at 3.

8. 88.3 ROBISON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

4/10/2017 7:26 PM

THE COLORADO RIVER REVISITED

557

until December 31, 2026. 415
2. Second-Best Solutions & Surrogacy Reassessed
As with rationing and risk allocation, the Basin Study’s
water supply and demand projections suggest the need for wellconceived measures for managing actual or potential
interpretive conflicts rooted in the apportionments may very
well heighten going forward. Consider as a case in point the
Article III(c) disputes preceding the Interim Guidelines’
formation. These conflicts ensued with the historic drought and
“brought the basin closer to multi-state and inter-basin
litigation than perhaps any time since adoption of the
Compact.” 416 There are many related ambiguities in the
Compact—as examined in Part III—and other parts of the Law
of the River whose clarification similarly may require delicate
handling in coming years.
Yet this general prognosis raises challenging questions as
applied to the existing reservoir operating regimes and their
surrogacy. Does the Interim Guidelines’ coordinated operating
regime for Lake Powell and Lake Mead, coupled with the Basin
States’ Agreement, provide the optimal way to address Article
III(c)? If not, which alternatives may be preferable and why?
Similar queries might also be posed for Article 10(b) of the
U.S.-Mexico Treaty, but my focus will stay at the domestic
level. Given Article III(c)’s significance within the Compact’s
apportionment, it is critical for policymakers to engage these
questions in conjunction with the guidelines’ formal review.417
A few associated comments will be offered.
As a starting point, the apparent virtue or vice of the
existing approach to Article III(c) is that it is, by definition,
temporary and avoids any formal interpretation of the
provision or its counterparts. It constitutes an “interim and
avoidant” conflict management method. These attributes make
sense. The “immediate challenge” to which the Interim
Guidelines responded was “how to resolve the conflicting views
of the Upper and Lower Division states” regarding Article III(c)
“for an interim period in order to allow enough time to reach a
415. Id.
416. See INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 11.
417. See Grant, supra note 212, at 983–84 (discussing Article III(c)’s
significance to water availability).
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long-term solution.” 418 Nearly a decade later, however, what is
the long-term solution? More to the point, might it be desirable
for this solution to settle Article III(c)’s interpretation and
implementation in a more lasting manner? To what extent, if
any, is it problematic for the provision’s meaning essentially to
be left hanging out there? An approach to Article III(c) that is
more solid temporally and substantively might be conducive to
progressive water planning and management in the Basin
States. 419 Such an approach also might provide heightened
assurance that the Secretary of the Interior’s reservoir
operations indeed comply with Article III(c). 420
But this branch of the allocation framework’s evolution is
rife with second-best solutions. While the Interim Guidelines’
interim and avoidant qualities may be suboptimal features of
an Article III(c) conflict management method, alternatives pose
seemingly steeper challenges. Consider for starters reverting to
the Long-Range Operating Criteria for Lake Powell’s and Lake
Mead’s operation after the guidelines expire. These criteria
reference an 8.23 maf minimum objective release from Lake
Powell annually, and this floor is markedly higher than the 7.0
and 7.48 maf releases allowed under the guidelines. 421 The
flexibility, if any, of the 8.23 maf minimum objective release is
unclear to this author, but neither its higher floor nor its
contested inclusion of an Upper Division states’ treaty flow
contribution appear to be attributes favored by those states.
That said, the Long-Range Operating Criteria and Interim
Guidelines do share common ground vis-à-vis Article III(c) in
that neither entails formal interpretation of the provision or its
neighbors. 422 Such interpretations might issue from the
Supreme Court. But as Arizona v. California poignantly
exemplifies, “[t]he terror of original jurisdiction litigation is its
418. Schiffer et al., supra note 196, at 218 (internal punctuation omitted).
419. See Getches & Meyers, supra note 248, at 58 (“If the precise obligations of
the Upper Basin states were known, planning for growth and for future water
projects could be done more intelligently.”).
420. See Colorado River Basin Project Act § 601(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1551(c) (2012)
(mandating compliance); Colorado River Storage Project Act § 14, 43 U.S.C. §
620m (2012) (same).
421. Compare LROC, supra note 205, at art. II(2), with INTERIM GUIDELINES
ROD, supra note 158, at 50, 52–53.
422. See LROC, supra note 205, at art. IV(b) (disclaiming interpretive effect on
“surplus” in Article III(c)); INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 57
(providing reservoir operations under guidelines “shall not represent
interpretations of existing law”).
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unpredictability.” 423 Further considerations include exorbitant
costs, attenuated timelines, and interstate acrimony, rather
than comity, all of which would heighten if “interpretive creep”
were to occur such that a narrow Article III(c) question
ballooned into broad Compact construction. 424 These concerns
assuredly underpin the Basin States’ Agreement’s mandatory
consultation provision. 425 Article VI of the Compact also
deserves mention in this vein. It outlines a procedure for Basin
States to resolve “any claim or controversy” regarding the
“meaning or performance of any of the terms of this compact”
by appointing “Commissioners with power to consider and
adjust such claim or controversy.” 426 Although possibly
attractive at first blush, any resolution forged by the
Commissioners is “subject to ratification by the Legislatures of
the States so affected.” 427 Some circularity and, most critically,
a veto power are thus drawbacks.
“Most problems concerning the allocation and management
of river resources ideally would be resolved by mutual
agreement of the states . . . .” 428 Applicable to Article III(c)’s
future handling and otherwise, Meyers and David Getches
expressed this view two years before Meyers’s passing in
1988. 429 It circles back to the Interim Guidelines and Basin
States’ Agreement. Their consensual nature foreseeably will
and should guide prospective approaches to Article III(c). The
downsides of alternatives are daunting—particularly, Supreme
Court litigation. A salient question, however, is what else can
consensus yield? Could consensus-based processes amend
Article III(c) in isolation to make its meaning explicit? Such an
effort might involve collaboration and control that would
distinguish it from attempts to tailor litigation narrowly to
Article III(c) and avoid interpretive creep. Given its connection
with other Compact provisions, however, this dynamic seems
inevitable even outside litigation. 430 From this perspective, the
existing surrogate approach very well may be the best
423. Carlson & Boles, supra note 199, at § 21.04[3].
424. See Kuhn, supra note 171, at 32 (describing how Supreme Court could not
interpret Article III(c) without interpreting other provisions).
425. Basin States’ Agreement, supra note 158, at 10.
426. Compact, supra note 18, § 37-61-101, art. VI.
427. Id.
428. Getches & Meyers, supra note 248, at 70.
429. HALL, supra note 12, at 194–95.
430. Fulp Interview, supra note 395.

8. 88.3 ROBISON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

560

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

4/10/2017 7:26 PM

[Vol. 88

consensus-based option possible, notwithstanding its interim
and avoidant qualities. Assuming so for now, key subjects
requiring attention during formal review of the Interim
Guidelines’ coordinated operating regime include (1) the
regime’s specific treatment of Article III(c) flow volumes in its
Lake Powell release schedules, and (2) the regime’s duration
and provision for off-ramps (reconsultation) if severe climate
change-based reductions in Lee Ferry flows occur.
C.

Of Economy: Constraint Avoidance & Mitigation
1. Programmatic Iteration

Overlapping inextricably with the material above on
interpretive conflict management and rationing and risk
allocation is a third adaptive pattern readily discernible in the
allocation framework’s evolution since The Colorado River. It
involves the emergence of conservation- and flexibility-oriented
measures aimed at avoiding, and mitigating the impacts of,
constraints
on
consumptive
use
imposed
by
the
apportionments. Alongside augmentation efforts and rationing
rules prescribed by the reservoir operating regimes, these
measures bear directly on the water supply and demand
imbalance’s current and future scope.
A host of programs fall within this line. They include the
Lower Basin water banking program formed in 1999, the
Interim Guidelines’ ICS and DSS programs adopted in 2007,
Minute 319’s deferred deliveries programs (water deferred and
ICMA) formulated in 2012, and the Pilot System Conservation
Program and Pilot Drought Response Actions program
commenced in 2014. This author anticipates most, if not all, of
these programs will persist in successive forms. To synthesize
the state of play, however, Minute 319’s water deferred and
ICMA programs will expire on December 31, 2017, 431 and the
Pilot Drought Response Actions program will operate up to
December 31, 2019. 432 The timeline for the Interim Guidelines’
ICS and DSS programs is more nuanced. Portions of the former
program involving Extraordinary Conservation ICS and

431. MINUTE 319, supra note 136, at 19. Deferred deliveries may occur
afterward. Id.
432. PDRA Memo, supra note 382, at 10.
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System Efficiency ICS will lapse on the general expiration
date, December 31, 2025, while portions governing Tributary
ICS and Imported ICS, as well as the DSS program, will run
until December 13, 2057. 433 As for the Pilot System
Conservation Program, its sunset is tethered more openendedly to December 31 of the year in which the latest
implementation agreement expires. 434 Overall, the programs
thus largely (though not uniformly) will continue in their
existing forms for a relatively limited period of ten years.
2. Diffusion & Performance-Based Assessment
Paralleling the other adaptive patterns, further
innovations aimed at conserving, and affording flexibility in the
use of, Colorado River System water appear as inevitable as
they are sensible. Yet again the water supply and demand
imbalance, coupled with the Basin Study’s projections of
climate change-based Lee Ferry flow reductions and basinwide
consumptive use increases, support this general prognosis and
prescription. My specific commentary regarding the
continuation of this pattern into the future concerns two topics:
(1) diffusion of a Lower Colorado River program analogue
within the Upper Basin, and (2) performance-based
assessments of the Lower Colorado River programs and
derivative insights.
Existing programs in this realm fall almost exclusively
along the Lower Colorado River. This disparity tees up the
need for innovation above Lee Ferry. Only the Pilot System
Conservation Program applies within the Upper Basin—a
$3.75 million portion of it to be precise 435—while the
preponderance of this program and entirety of its counterparts
adhere within the Lower Basin. At the same time, the water
supply and demand imbalance and Basin Study’s projections
suggest a hefty premium should be placed on measures to
conserve, and to afford flexibility to users of, the “leftovers.”
The Pilot System Conservation Program reflects this priority,
as do emerging intrastate water banking and temporary
433. INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 57–58. The general
expiration date does not apply to deliveries of Extraordinary Conservation ICS
and System Efficiency ICS. Id. at 58.
434. CRSCP Agreement, supra note 288, at 9.
435. See sources cited supra note 291.
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transfer arrangements addressing the distribution of pre- and
post-1922 water rights in Upper Division states. 436 Yet there is
no analogue under the Upper Basin Compact to (1) the Lower
Basin water banking program or Interim Guidelines’ ICS and
DSS programs associated with the Arizona v. California decree,
or (2) the deferred deliveries programs under the U.S.-Mexico
Treaty. An interstate analogue of this type should be
envisioned. And as with the preparation of Article IV
curtailment guidelines for the Upper Basin Compact, it seems
prudent for this process to occur now rather than in a
potentially higher-pressure future setting. The Basin Study
again evidenced support for this idea, 437 and reference points
assuredly could be found in the Pilot System Conservation
Program, Lower Colorado River programs, and ongoing
intrastate water banking efforts.
Shifting attention downstream of Lee Ferry, a host of
comments could be offered about the Lower Colorado River
programs’ future, but mine will be framed around one
presumably uncontroversial proposition: the prospective
existence and shape of these programs should be informed by
assessing their actual performance on the ground. Are the
programs achieving programmatic and collective conservation
goals to the extent, and in the particular manner, considered
optimal or necessary? This question needs to be asked and
pursued on a recurring basis. It is difficult or impossible to
answer at this time for certain programs due to their recency
(Pilot System Conservation Program, Pilot Drought Response
Actions program) or non-utilization (Interim Guidelines’ DSS
program, Minute 319’s ICMA program). Nonetheless, several
insights can be gleaned from programs that have seen action
thus far below Lee Ferry, especially those associated with the
Arizona v. California decree (Lower Basin water banking
program, Interim Guidelines’ ICS program). Four takeaways
are notable.
First, the Lower Basin water banking program seems to
undermine the other Lower Colorado River programs’ core goal
of conserving Lake Mead’s storage to prevent shortages and
critical elevations. As detailed in Part III, the SNWA has been
the sole entity to utilize this program to date, banking 931,266

436.
437.

See supra section III.C.2.a.
TECHNICAL REPORT F, supra note 268, at F-59 to -60.
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acre-feet in offstream locations as of 2015. 438 This water surely
provides valuable security for dealing with shortages under the
Interim Guidelines. By definition, however, it is not banked in
Lake Mead. As flagged above, the Pilot Drought Response
Action program appears to reflect this programmatic tension by
allowing creation of protection volumes through “reductions in
off-stream storage of Colorado River water.” 439 In short, if
conserving Lake Mead’s storage is paramount, the Lower Basin
water banking program needs to be understood as contrary to
this goal. Its role within the Lower Colorado River programs as
a suite needs to be re-evaluated, including potentially curbing
its usage and devising measures to motivate entitlement
holders like the SNWA to bank water in Lake Mead through
the ICS program instead. The SNWA’s activities since the ICS
program came online support this transition. Whereas the
SNWA stored 552,520 acre-feet through the Lower Basin water
banking program from 2001 to 2007, it stored 378,746 acre-feet
via the program from 2008 to 2015, simultaneously creating
627,713 acre-feet of ICS across the latter period. 440 All told,
drawing down Lake Mead’s storage to bank Colorado River
System water elsewhere is not a self-regarding act, whether in
the form of the SNWA’s 931,266 acre-feet banked through the
Lower Basin program or the AWBA’s 3.4 maf banked on an
intrastate basis. 441 This roughly 4.3 maf impacts all parties
conjoined by the shortage-sharing rules for Lake Mead,
domestically and internationally, as well as by the coordinated
operating regime for it and Lake Powell. 442
Second, participation in the ICS program has been
relatively modest to date, evincing a need for strategies to
promote higher levels of engagement and conservation. More
than 150 parties hold entitlements to Lower Colorado River
water, with roughly a dozen entitled to consume or divert over
100,000 acre-feet annually. 443 Yet only the SNWA and MWD
438. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 34 tbl.12.
439. PDRA Memo, supra note 382, at 6.
440. See sources cited supra notes 350 and 364.
441. AWBA 2015 REPORT, supra note 352, at 1, 11 tbl.4.
442. This point may be thought of in terms of relative beneficiaries. The scope
of “mitigation beneficiaries” of this 4.3 maf in banked water is plainly narrower
than the scope of parties that would benefit if the water (i.e., that portion of it
capable of storage as ICS) instead had been stored in Lake Mead.
443. Lists of these parties can be found at Lower Colorado River Water
Entitlements Listing, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
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have been significant ICS program participants, while the
CAWCD and IID have been marginally engaged. As noted
earlier, these parties created 1,461,490 acre-feet of ICS in Lake
Mead between 2006 and 2015 in the following shares: MWD,
698,860 acre-feet; SNWA, 627,713 acre-feet; CAWCD, 103,050
acre-feet; and IID, 31,867 acre-feet. 444
Two broad issues stem from these figures: (1) how to
motivate more Lower Colorado River entitlement holders to
participate in the ICS program, and (2) how to prompt higher
levels of ICS creation by participants. One simple but practical
response concerns Bureau of Reclamation marketing.445
Perhaps more intensive efforts to disseminate ICS program
information to, and to solicit engagement by, entitlement
holders might be a boon. Another angle involves re-evaluating
ICS creation limits. Liberalization of annual and cumulative
caps on the creation of Extraordinary Conservation ICS
deserves thought. 446 So, too, does reassessment of limits on ICS
retrieval—specifically, provisions limiting the circumstances in
which ICS can be delivered and annual deliveries of
Extraordinary Conservation ICS. 447 Admittedly, these delivery
limits entail striking a delicate balance between protecting
Lake Mead’s storage on one hand, and avoiding the
disincentivizing perception and possible reality that ICS will
become a stranded asset on the other. 448 ICS alienability is a
final topic of note. Although allowing market-based transfers of
ICS might spur program participation and ICS creation, the
Interim Guidelines do not by their terms address such
transfers, instead focusing solely on ICS retrieval by
entitlement holders that created it. 449 In contrast, the Lower
Basin water banking program expressly allows non-federal
region/g4000/contracts/entitlements.html (last
updated June
4,
2015)
[https://perma.cc/75TZ-8954]. Parties with entitlements allowing for consumptive
use or diversion of more than 100,000 acre-feet annually include the CAWCD,
CVWD, Colorado River Indian Reservation, Fort Mojave Indian Reservation, IID,
MWD, Palo Verde Irrigation District, SNWA, Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and
Drainage District, Yuma County Water Users’ Association, and Yuma Mesa
Irrigation and Drainage District. Id.
444. See sources cited supra note 364 and 367.
445. Fulp Interview, supra note 395.
446. See INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 41 (imposing ICS
creation limits).
447. See id. at 42–43 (prescribing ICS delivery limits).
448. Fulp Interview, supra note 395.
449. See INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 27.
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parties to a SIRA to assign their interests to consuming or
storing entities. 450 It is worth considering how the ICS program
might be similarly tailored, including the formulation of
policies governing (1) eligibility (types of parties eligible to
engage in ICS transfers); 451 (2) review processes (procedural
steps for submitting ICS transfer proposals and review
criteria); and (3) accounting (verification and accounting
methods for ICS transfers).
Third, contrasting with the retrieval-oriented nature of the
ICS program and Minute 319’s water deferred program, the
“system water” concept of the Pilot System Conservation
Program warrants further study as a potentially more effective
means for conserving Lake Mead’s storage. By the pilot
program’s terms, “system conservation water” accrues “to the
benefit of the overall Colorado River System, not for the benefit
of any Local Funding Agency, System Conservation
Implementation Agreement signatory, or third-party.” 452 None
of these parties can retrieve system water once it has been
created. This non-retrieval aspect of the program is distinct
from its predecessors, which, as identified earlier, enabled
728,478 acre-feet to be withdrawn from Lake Mead over the
preceding decade—623,410 and 105,068 acre-feet of ICS and
water deferred, respectively. 453 Allowing such retrievals fully
makes sense from an incentivization perspective. But it also
seems plain that dedicating conserved water to the Colorado
River System might more effectively shore up storage.
Policymakers should analyze carefully the system water
concept’s efficacy as the pilot program rolls out, including while
assessing its extension or permanence. Two historical and
projected figures deserve close attention: (1) yield-to-cost
ratio—the ratio of system water conserved, or capable of being
conserved, to program expenditures, and (2) marginal
efficiency—the relative conservation achieved through system
water expenditures as compared to alternative conservation
potentially achieved through ICS or other Pilot Drought
Response Actions program investments. System water funding
450. 43 C.F.R. § 414.3(d) (2016).
451. An interesting issue regarding eligibility is whether ICS might be
transferred to parties interested in non-consumptive use of it—e.g., for retention
in Lake Mead or perhaps downstream instream flows.
452. CRSCP Agreement, supra note 288, at 14.
453. See sources cited supra notes 149, 150, 364, and 367.
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poses challenges, 454 but solid marks in these areas would favor
the concept’s growth.
Fourth, and of greatest importance, the collective
performance of the Lower Colorado River programs up to this
point very much leaves open to question, in this author’s view,
the capacity of these programs and their counterparts to
address the fundamental challenge facing the Lower Division
states: the structural deficit. This concern is grave, but it needs
to be addressed openly, and one way of doing so is by looking a
few things in the face.
Consider initially the bottom line regarding conservation of
Lake Mead’s storage. The Lower Colorado River programs
appear to have bolstered it, or to be in the process of bolstering
it, by slightly over 1.0 maf since the ICS program’s genesis. The
ICS and water deferred programs appear to have made a
contribution of roughly 980,000 acre-feet. Specifically, the
Bureau of Reclamation’s most recent water accounting report
in 2015 noted balances of 711,864 acre-feet of ICS and 230,528
acre-feet of water deferred, 455 and 40,851 acre-feet should be
added to the former per a system assessment. 456
Supplementing this conservation is the 63,000 acre-feet yield
anticipated for the Lower Basin component of the Pilot System
Conservation Program. 457 Taken together, this conserved
storage totals 1,046,243 acre-feet. 458
Cutting the other way is the Lower Basin water banking
program’s depletion of Lake Mead. As acknowledged earlier,
the SNWA’s offstream banking under this program (as well as
that of the AWBA on an intrastate basis) undoubtedly provides
valuable security given the seeming eventuality of a Lower
Colorado River shortage. That said, it bears highlighting that
the 931,266 acre-feet drawn from Lake Mead by the SNWA
closely approximates the 1,046,243 acre-feet in conserved
storage just noted. 459 A net gain of 114,977 acre-feet in Lake
454. Fulp Interview, supra note 395.
455. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 28 tbl.9, 49 tbl.23.
456. See INTERIM GUIDELINES ROD, supra note 158, at 40 (imposing
assessment). This 39,594 acre-feet figure is derived from the sources cited supra
notes 364 and 367.
457. Pilot Program, supra note 288.
458. This total does not account for activities being undertaken under the Pilot
Drought Response Actions program that go beyond either ICS creation or water
storage through the Pilot System Conservation Program.
459. 2015 ACCOUNTING, supra note 149, at 34 tbl.12.
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Mead’s storage appears to be the end result of the Lower
Colorado River programs’ interplay.
Now ultimately reconcile these figures with the structural
deficit. To reiterate, a basic rule of thumb is that if annual
releases from Lake Powell average 8.23 maf (historical
minimum objective release), and annual consumptive use along
the Lower Colorado River averages 7.5 maf (Arizona v.
California decree’s apportionment for normal conditions),
“Lake Mead will lose about a million acre-feet of storage per
year.” 460 More precisely, the deficit is understood to range from
1.0 to 1.2 maf annually. 461 And the Basin Study’s projections
suggest it is not going away. The forecast of decreased Lee
Ferry flows due to climate change and increased consumptive
use in Upper Division states suggests average annual Lake
Powell releases will approximate the legal minimum in coming
years. Assuming that minimum is 8.23 maf and not something
less, the obvious point is that the structural deficit exceeds by
an order of magnitude the conservation as-yet yielded by the
Lower Colorado River programs—again, 114,977 acre-feet of
additional Lake Mead storage. Even focusing solely on the
1,046,243 acre-feet of conserved storage since the ICS
program’s emergence—and ignoring the 931,266 acre-feet of
offstream interstate water banking—the former amount is
equivalent to approximately one year of the structural deficit. A
Herculean effort is needed from this vantage point. And the
geneses of the Lower Basin pilot programs and drought
contingency plan are wholly unsurprising in this light. So, too,
is ongoing discourse about the perceived need for large-scale
augmentation, 462 the questionable adequacy of the Interim
Guidelines to stave off Lake Mead’s continued decline, 463 and,
when all is said and done, “the responsibility of all Lower Basin
states and water users and the United States to take action to
close the structural deficit.” 464
460. Kuhn, supra note 171, at 34.
461. Id.; CAP 2015 REVIEW, supra note 320, at 2.
462. BASIN STATES’ COMMITMENTS, supra note 86, at 3.
463. See, e.g., CENT. ARIZ. PROJECT, 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 8 (2014),
http://www.cap-az.com/documents/departments/finance/CAP-2014-Year-InReview.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKX9-VA4N] (quoting CAP Deputy General
Manager of Maintenance and Operations, Tom McCann, as describing Interim
Guidelines “will not be sufficient to prevent the continued decline of Lake Mead”).
464. CENT. ARIZ. PROJECT, THE STATE OF THE COLORADO RIVER 2 (2014)
(emphasis
added),
http://www.cap-az.com/documents/departments/planning/
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V. CONCLUSION
The structural deficit along the Lower Colorado River is a
weighty but fitting topic on which to conclude, for it brings the
discussion full circle to the Introduction—to Lady Bird
Johnson’s dedication of Glen Canyon Dam fifty years ago in the
heart of Interior Secretary Stewart Udall’s “superlative” “home
country,” 465 and to former Stanford Law School Dean Charles
Meyers’s contemporaneous publication of The Colorado River.
So much of what has filled the preceding pages—as well as
those of Meyers’s “magisterial” piece 466—has to do with Rocky
Mountain snowmelt impounded by Glen Canyon Dam. It is this
snowmelt that largely animates the living river system called
the “Colorado,” and that has been the highly coveted prize
around which the Law of the River’s allocation framework has
grown since Meyers’s scholarship and a half-century prior.
Diverse changes are apparent when considering the original
and current states of the apportionments performing the multilayered, multi-jurisdictional allocation. And inextricable with
these changes are numerous socio-legal factors reflecting
evolving conditions and values within and beyond the Colorado
River Basin. It is and always will be an instance of
institutional evolution embedded within broader social
evolution, and reciprocity between water law and the social
order that is its “habitat.” 467 While it is hoped that the
evolutionary survey and adaptive framing commentary in the
previous Parts prove of practical value to readers, it is this
deeper topic of the Law of the River’s formative role in shaping
foundational aspects of the social order in and around the basin
that will be sounded on a final note. “Conflicts over the
river . . . encompass values that run to the core of our social
organization.” 468 Meyers and David Getches expressed this
point elegantly thirty years ago: “New industry may supplant a
pastoral society; the quality of life in a vast land area may rise
or fall; major demographic shifts may occur; nature’s plan for
an entire region may be forever obscured; ancient Indian
colorado-river-programs/State-of-the-River-2014.pdf
NXF8].
465. GLEN CANYON TRANSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 3.
466. HALL, supra note 12, at 168.
467. WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 81.
468. Getches & Meyers, supra note 248, at 52–53.

[https://perma.cc/M5D8-
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cultures may live or die.” 469 The truth of these words is
irrefutable. And their gravity cannot be taken lightly. For they
reflect what has always been at stake: “a national symbol of the
highest order,” 470 flowing through a “very precious and very
special” 471 place, whose “heritage . . . is so much richer” 472 than
we may ever know.

469.
470.
471.
472.

Id. at 53.
Id. at 51.
GLEN CANYON TRANSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 10.
Id.

